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From Darfur to Sinai to Kashmir: Ethno-
Religious Conflicts and Legalization
SANDEEP GOPALANt
This Article analyzes peace agreements in regions with
a history of ethno-religious conflicts to determine if there
are correlations between the form and substance of the
agreements and their successful implementation. For
purposes of comparison, I examine several agreements
between India and Pakistan, the historic agreement
between Israel and Egypt, and the Darfur Peace
Agreement, as exemplars of similar conflict situations
where a study of agreement design has salience. I
endeavour to apply the legalization theory articulated by
Kenneth Abbott, et al., to test the explanatory power of the
obligation-precision- delegation matrix.1  The Kashmir
dispute has raged on for over five decades and has
consumed thousands of lives making the region one of the
most dangerous conflict zones in the modern world. 2 The
terrible price, both in terms of human lives and defense
expenditures, has not made much of an impact in pushing
the parties towards finding a peaceful solution. 3 This
t B.C.L., D.Phil. (University of Oxford), Associate Professor of Law & Faculty
Fellow, Center for Law, Science, and Technology, Arizona State University. The
author wishes to thank Tatiana Markel, Amy Frisch, Anshu Pasricha and the
editorial staff of the Buffalo Law Review for their excellent editorial assistance.
1. See generally Kenneth Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L
ORG. 401 (2000).
2. See generally Manjeet S. Pardesi & Sumit Ganguly, The Rise of India and
the India-Pakistan Conflict, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Winter 2007, at 131.
3. See NAZIR KAMAL & AMIT GUPTA, SANDIA NAT'L LABS. COOP. MONITORING
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indifference to cost is not unique-several other dyads that
are deeply sundered by ethnic and religious divisions share
the same disregard for human suffering with the same
devastating consequences. 4 The fragility of peace in these
conflict zones and the fluctuation of rhetoric depending on
the regime in power have meant that hope for a peaceful
settlement is slim, 5 which might explain the shortage of
significant attention to the analysis of such peace
negotiations and agreements by legal scholars. The closed
and secret nature of the negotiations and the low
involvement of the legal community in them have
contributed to this state of affairs. One consequence of such
indifference has been the repetition of the same features in
agreements despite evidence of failure. The scholarly
community has to analyze the agreements to unearth
avenues that can maximize the probability of better
outcomes if the situation is to improve.6 Scholarly attention
to the design and structure of agreements between these
parties can help us to understand whether there is a
correlation between the choice of form and substance and
their successful implementation. 7 Legal scholars have
deferred for too long to the view that politics, rather than
CTR., PROSPECTS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN SOUTH ASIA 9 (1998),
http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/cmc-papers/sand98-05055.pdf.
4. Some scholars characterize these conflicts as "intranational" disputes. See
UNIV. OF MD. CTR. FOR INT'L DEV. & CONFLICT MGMT., PEACE AND CONFLICT 2003:
A GLOBAL SURVEY OF ARMED CONFLICTS, SELF DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS, AND
DEMOCRACY (2003), http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/PC03.pdf.
5. See generally Sumathi Subbiah, Security Council Mediation and the
Kashmir Dispute: Reflections on Its Failures and Possibilities for Renewal, 27
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 173 (2004).
6. Orde Kittrie suggests that this lack of examination is not unique to the
case of India and Pakistan. Orde F. Kittrie, More Process Than Peace:
Legitimacy, Compliance, and the Oslo Accords, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1661, 1662
(2003). According to Kittrie there has been an absence of sufficient examination
and analysis even of more high profile conflicts such as the one between Israel
and Palestine by legal scholars. He writes that "the legal literature contains
virtually no discussion of what in the contents of a bilateral peace agreement's
text can maximize the likelihood that the parties will comply with the peace
agreement's terms." Id.
7. See Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status, 100
AM. J. INT'L L. 373 ("Some 50 percent of civil wars have terminated in peace
agreements since 1990, more than in the previous two centuries combined,
when only one in five resulted in negotiated settlement. Numerically, these
settlements amount to over three hundred peace agreements in some forty
jurisdictions.").
[Vol. 55404
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law, is the answer to these disputes. This deference is
fundamentally flawed and an examination of the
agreements using legalization theory may help to bridge the
gap between law and politics. It will cast light on the role of
law in solving disputes characterized by ethno-religious
hatreds, and will demonstrate that contract-like forms are
preferable for agreement design. I analyze agreements
between India and Pakistan, Israel and Egypt, and the
Darfur Peace Agreement, to demonstrate that agreements
that are high on the precision-obligation-delegation matrix
enjoy higher degrees of success than those that are low on
this matrix when concluded in dispute scenarios involving
ethno-religious conflicts. I conclude by arguing that India
and Pakistan should aim for hard legalization to solve the
Kashmir dispute, and that they must learn from the painful
experience of the Darfur Peace Agreement and include non-
state actors as signatories to any agreement.
I. LEGALIZATION THEORY
Legalization theory argues that states choose to legalize
their agreements when the issue is one of commitment or
coordination with the objective being to benefit from
cooperative action.8 According to this view, there is a cost-
benefit analysis that states engage in when deciding
whether or not to legalize, with the choice depending on
legalization's ability to deliver outcomes that are more
beneficial than non-legalization. 9 Some of these benefits
include the ability of legalization to supply credibility to
commitments, to lower ex post transaction costs, and to
supply monitoring mechanisms. 10 Kenneth Abbott and
Duncan Snidal posit that harder legalization makes state
commitments more credible by creating precise agreements
which contain obligations of a higher order.1 They argue
that transaction costs ex ante are higher with hard
legalization because of the difficulty of negotiation and
8. See Miles Kahler, The Causes and Consequences of Legalization, 54 INT'L
ORG. 661, 663 (2000).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. (discussing points raised by Abbott and Snidal).
20071 405
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obtaining agreement on these sorts of agreements. 12 It is
likely that, as the levels of obligation and precision
increase, the more difficult it will be for states to bind
themselves because of the fear of being in breach of these
obligations and the minimizing of wiggle room to make
excuses. 13 This increased cost ab initio may be offset by
lowered costs after agreement has been reached, because
the existence of precise obligations makes enforcement
easier and because many hard legalized agreements create
tribunals for interpretation and enforcement. 14 Monitoring
costs are thus reduced and may justify the expenditure of
resources ab initio.'5 Abbott and Snidal also point to
sovereignty costs (by which they mean incursions on state
sovereignty in the subject area) as being a factor that can
militate against hard legalization. "They hypothesize that a
combination of high uncertainty and low sovereignty costs
will lead to institutions with lower precision coupled with
higher obligation and moderate delegation. High
sovereignty costs and lower uncertainty are likely to
produce greater precision and obligation with less
delegation."16
The relative power relationship between states is also a
factor in determining the extent to which legalization
occurs. More powerful states have little or no incentives to
legalize when dealing with less powerful states as they may
be able to obtain outcomes that they want without resorting
to legalization. Kahler argues that the power asymmetry
argument is "heavily qualified" by the fact that the
strongest advocates for legalization are the United States
and Europe, two of the strongest international actors.' 7
Abbott and Snidal suggest that there is a preference for
softer forms of legalization when powerful states are
involved, upon the understanding that there will be long
term advantages in the form of lowered transaction costs.' 8
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 665.
17. Id. at 666.
18. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in
International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 448 (2000).
[Vol. 55406
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Kahler suggests that asymmetries may extend beyond
those involving mere power (there may be asymmetries in
terms of legal skills) that explain the unwillingness of some
states, particularly developing ones, to legalize
agreements. 19
II. CASE STUDIES
A. India-Pakistan
India and Pakistan attained independence in August of
1947, Pakistan celebrating its freedom on the 14th while
India observing its birth as a nation on the 15th. Statehood
on communal lines following British colonialism was the
result of an acrimonious process of partitioning pre-
independent India into Muslim Pakistan, and
predominantly Hindu India.2 0 This redrawing of the maps
saw one of the biggest human relocations in history as
people uprooted and moved from villages and towns that
they had called home for generations. 21 Such a birth was
19. Kahler, supra note 8, at 666. One exception is the example of "[s]mall
European states [which] are strong proponents of legalization, not only because
they wish to constrain the behavior of their more powerful neighbors, but also
because they possess legal resources out of proportion to their other
capabilities." Id.
20. The partition followed the Independence Act which permitted the
leaders of the 565 semi-independent princely states owned by the British to
choose independence (not a viable option) or accession to either India or
Pakistan. See Anthony Wanis St. John, The Mediating Role in the Kashmir
Dispute Between India and Pakistan, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Winter/Spring
1997, at 173, 175.
21. Several accounts put the number of displaced people at over 12 million.
See, e.g., URVASHI BUTALIA, THE OTHER SIDE OF SILENCE: VOICES FROM THE
PARTITION OF INDIA 3 (Duke Univ. Press 2000) (1998).
The departure of barbers, weavers, tailors, goldsmiths, and others en
masse to Pakistan, crippled certain aspects of life particularly in Delhi.
In Pakistan, the departure of account clerks, bankers, lawyers and
teachers dealt a similar blow .... As a new country, Pakistan had no
instant arrangements to print its currency: the mint was in India .... So,
for about a year, Pakistani currency . . . was printed in India, as was
much government material and stationary .... Pakistani officers (for
currency) were trained in India for several weeks and India loaned
accountants to Pakistan to help out with accounting work.
Id. at 68-69.
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not conducive to a peaceful co-existence. 22 From the
beginning there was rancor over the princely state of
Kashmir, which had not acceded to India or Pakistan as of
August 15, 1947.23 Strenuous efforts were underway on
both sides to get Kashmir to join either, and the situation
was complicated by the fact that the king of Kashmir was a
Hindu while the majority of his subjects were Muslims. 24
The king seemed to prefer independence, as he neither
wanted to be part of an Islamic country by joining Pakistan,
nor did he want to cede power by joining secular India.
Ultimately, on October 26, 1947 the king, seeing that he
had very little choice, signed the Instrument of Accession
and Kashmir became a part of India. 25 Paragraph 4 of the
Instrument of Accession clearly states that "I hereby
declare that I accede to the Dominion of India . "..."26 The
Schedule, which enumerates legislative powers, states that
22. See generally Jeffrey Weiss, India and Pakistan - A Cautionary Tale for
Israel and Palestine, 18 CONN. J. INT'L L. 455 (2003).
23. See Karen Heymann, Earned Sovereignty for Kashmir: The Legal
Methodology to Avoiding a Nuclear Holocaust, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 153, 158
(2003).
24. See St. John, supra note 20, at 174-75; see also Brian Farrell, The Role of
International Law in the Kashmir Conflict, 21 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 293
(2003); Heymann, supra note 23, at 160.
25. See St. John, supra note 20, at 174-75. "As a condition for receiving
Indian military reinforcements to repel an invasion of Pathtun tribal raiders,
Hari Singh signed a letter of accession to India on October 26, 1947." Id. This
instrument was worked out under the provisions of the Government of India
Act of 1935, an Act of the British Parliament, which served as the Indian
Constitution at the time by virtue of the Indian Independence Act of 1947. The
relevant provision providing for accessions stated that "[an Indian State shall
be deemed to have acceded to the dominion if the Governor General of India has
signified the acceptance of an instrument of accession executed by the ruler
thereof." Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India,
http://mha.nic.inacc.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2007). Maharaja Hari Singh of
Kashmir executed the Instrument of Accession and the Governor General
accepted the Instrument. This Act was acknowledged by the U.S. in the United
Nations Security Council in 1948 by U.S. representative Warren Austin, who
stated that 'the external sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir is no longer under
the Maharaja. With the accession of Jammu and Kashmir with India, this
sovereignty went over to India and is exercised by India."' Consulate General of
India, Legality of the Accession of Kashmir, http://www.indiaconsulate.org.br/
comercial/p_naoresidentes/LegalityoftheAccessionofKashmir.htm (last visited
May 25, 2007).
26. Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir State, Oct. 26, 1947,
available at http://mha.nic.in/accdoc.htm. The agreement shows that a set of
sovereign powers was retained by the Maharaja.
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the Dominion legislature (India) shall have the power to
make laws with regard to military and defense matters.27
In addition, India also has the power to make law with
regard to external relations.28 This accession was hotly
contested by Pakistan and a limited war broke out between
the two countries just a few months after independence in
1948.29 The festering conflict over this act of accession has
resulted in three wars and several skirmishes. 30 Kashmir
has become the central feature of the relationship between
the two countries, and movement on other contested issues
is very difficult without addressing this matter.3 1
1. Agreements Between the Parties. This section
analyzes the agreements between the parties in terms of
structure and design. The first agreement of significance is
the 1960 Indus River Waters Treaty. Given the hurried
nature of the partition of pre-independent India and the
spread of the resources, it was inevitable that fights would
break out over arbitrarily carved boundaries. Most
pregnant with potential for such a fight was the river
Indus, much more than a body of water for most Indians.
With the partition of the Indus Basin, and the breadbasket
state of Punjab, Pakistani Punjab was dependant on
irrigation facilities that were located in India. When the
dispute threatened to escalate, the World Bank stepped in
to facilitate negotiations. 32 After about a decade of
27. Id. sched., pt. A.
28. Id. sched., pt. B.
29. See St. John, supra note 20, at 174-75.
30. See id.
31. Kashmir seems to be the "core" issue for Pakistan in a way that it is not
for India. Pakistani politicians have repeatedly stated that other issues cannot
be addressed without solving the Kashmir dispute whereas the Indian approach
has been to de-link Kashmir from other issues, where it believes that progress
is possible. See KAMAL & GUPTA, supra note 3, at 13. The authors cite a public
survey in Pakistan showing that almost 80 percent of the Pakistani respondents
would not accept the status quo in Kashmir, id., illustrating that the Kashmir
issue is a part of the public consciousness in that country in a way that it is not
in India.
32. World Bank's successful intervention can be credited to its ability to
divorce the dispute from other disputes between the countries. See Letter from
Eugene Black, World Bank President, to Khwaja Nazimuddin, Prime Minister
of Pakistan (Nov. 8, 1951) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter] ("The
problem of development and use of the Indus basin water resources should be
2007] 409
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negotiation, Pakistan President Ayub Khan and Indian
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru signed the Treaty at
Karachi in 1960. 33
Throughout the process the World Bank was strongly
engaged in the negotiations frequently advancing the talks
by placing proposals and even raising funds to overcome
objections. 34 The World Bank was even a signatory to the
treaty.35 Giving up the idea that a shared utilization plan
would be the best option from a resource-allocation
standpoint 36 because the political hostilities did not allow
for it, 3 7 the treaty devised an elaborate method of sharing
the waters of the Indus, and allocated the water from the
eastern rivers38 to India and those from the western rivers
to Pakistan.39 It also allowed India to utilize water from the
solved on a functional and not a political plane, without relation to past
negotiations and past claims and independently of political issues.").
33. Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak.-Int'l Bank for Reconstr. & Dev., Sept.
19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 126 [hereinafter Indus Treaty]. The preamble states:
The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, being equally
desirous of attaining the most complete and satisfactory utilisation of the
waters of the Indus system of rivers and recognising the need, therefore,
of fixing and delimiting, in a spirit of goodwill and friendship, the rights
and obligations of each in relation to the other concerning the use of
these waters and of making provision for the settlement, in a cooperative
spirit ....
Id. pmbl.
34. The World Bank assembled a consortium of donors that pledged $900
million. See Kenneth M. Kauffman, The Indian Economy: Some Recent History
and Near Term Prospects, 7 AsIAN SURV. 405, 414-15 (1967).
35. See Indus Treaty, supra note 33.
36. See Letter, supra note 32 ("The water resources of the Indus basin
should be cooperatively developed and used in such manner as most effectively
to promote the economic development of the Indus basin viewed as a unit.").
37. But see Indus Treaty, supra note 33, art. VII, 1 ("The two Parties
recognize that they have a common interest in the optimum development of the
Rivers, and, to that end, they declare their intention to co-operate, by mutual
agreement, to the fullest possible extent.").
38. See id. art. I, 5 ("The term 'Eastern Rivers' means The Sutlej, The
Beas and The Ravi taken together."); id. art. II, 1 ("All the waters of the
Eastern Rivers shall be available for the unrestricted use of India, except as
otherwise expressly provided in this Article.").
39. See id. art. I, 6 ("The term 'Western Rivers' means The Indus, The
Jhelum and The Chenab taken together."); id. art. III, 1 ("Pakistan shall
receive for unrestricted use all those waters of the Western Rivers which India
2007] CONFLICTS AND LEGALIZATION 411
western rivers for some agricultural uses, and stipulated
the storage capacities of the various reservoirs. 40 Under
article VIII of the Treaty, the Permanent Indus
Commission was constituted and each country established
an office of the Commissioner for Indus Waters. 41 The
Permanent Indus Commission is made up of these two
commissioners and they are charged with the task of
operationalizing the Treaty and facilitating cooperation. 42
Each Commissioner is the representative of his or her
government for all matters arising out of the Treaty and are
required to meet periodically. 43 Amazingly, over eighty-six
such meetings have taken place between the two sides. 44
is under obligation to let flow under the provisions of Paragraph (2).").
40. See id. art. III, 2 ("India shall be under an obligation to let flow all the
waters of the Western Rivers, and shall not permit any interference with these
waters, except for the following uses, restricted (except as provided in item (c)
(ii) of Paragraph 5 of Annexure C) in the case of each of the rivers, The Indus,
The Jhelum and The Chenab, to the drainage basin thereof: (a) Domestic Use;
(b) Non-Consumptive Use; (c) Agricultural Use, as set out in Annexure C; and
(d) Generation of hydro-electric power, as set out in Annexure D.").
41. Id. art. VIII, 1 ("India and Pakistan shall each create a permanent
post of Commissioner for Indus Waters, and shall appoint to this post, as often
a vacancy occurs, a person who should ordinarily be a high-ranking engineer
competent in the field of hydrology and water-use. Unless either Government
should decide to take up any particular question directly with the other
Government, each Commissioner will be the representative of his Government
for all matters arising out of this Treaty, and will serve as the regular channel
of communication on all matters relating to the implementation of the Treaty,
and, in particular, with respect to (a) the furnishing or exchange of information
or data provided for in the Treaty, and (b) the giving of any notice or response to
any notice provided for in the Treaty.").
42. See id. art. VIII, 4 ("The purpose and functions of the Commission
shall be to establish and maintain co-operative arrangements for the
implementation of this Treaty, to promote co-operation between the Parties in
the development of the waters of the Rivers and, in particular, (a) to study and
report to the two Governments on any problem relating to the development of
the waters of the Rivers which may be jointly referred to the Commission by the
two Governments: in the event that a reference is made by one Government
alone, the Commissioner of the other Government shall obtain the
authorization of his Government before he proceeds to act on the reference; (b)
to make every effort to settle promptly, in accordance with the provisions of
article IX (1), any question arising thereunder ... ").
43. Id. art. VIII, 5 ("The Commission shall meet regularly at least once a
year, alternately in India and Pakistan. This regular annual meeting shall be
held in November or in such other month as may be agreed upon between the
Commissioners. The Commission shall also meet when requested by either
Commissioner.").
44. Press Release, Ministry of Water Resources, Rectification of Indus
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The Commissioners have the opportunity to tour the rivers
every five years. 45 The Treaty also requires them to host ad
hoc tours of sites promptly in case of request by the
Commissioner from the other country.46  Apart from
monitoring, these provisions serve as informational
safeguards and go a long way in defusing tensions that
stem largely from suspicion. By creating provisions that
seek to enhance transparency, the Treaty limits prisoners'
dilemma problems and serves to increase the likelihood of
cooperative outcomes. Kraska writes that the agreement
establishes constituencies
by broadening the numbers and types of participants throughout
the basin, including governments and non-governmental organizations.
The negotiations tend to include an array of scientific, technical,
environmental, ecological, legal, administrative, economic, and
military interests. The involvement of all of these interests has a
progressive effect, helping to build an integrated approach to civil
government and foreign relations.
4 7
Perhaps crucial to the success of the Treaty has been
the inclusion of detailed provisions pertaining to dispute
resolution. In the first instance, "differences" are to be
settled by the Commission by agreement. 48 In the event
that this mechanism does not resolve the problem, the
commissioners can individually refer the matter to a
"neutral expert."49 The "neutral expert," a highly qualified
Waters Treaty (July 23, 2002), available at http://pib.nic.in/archieve/
releng/lyr2002/rju12002/23072002/r230720029.html (last visited June 1, 2007).
45. Indus Treaty, supra note 33, art. VIII, 4(c) ("[T]o undertake, once in
every five years, a general tour of inspection of the Rivers for ascertaining the
facts connected with various developments and works on the Rivers ... ").
46. Id. art. VIII, 4(d) ("[T]o undertake promptly, at the request of either
Commissioner, a tour of inspection of such works or sites on the Rivers as may
be considered necessary by him for ascertaining the facts connected with those
works or sites ... ").
47. James Kraska, Sustainable Development is Security: The Role of
Transboundary River Agreements as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) in
South Asia, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 465, 498-99 (2003).
48. See Indus Treaty, supra note 33, art. IX, 1 ("Any question which arises
between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty
or the existence of any fact which, if established, might constitute a breach of
this Treaty shall first be examined by the Commission, which will endeavour to
resolve the question by agreement.").
49. Id. art. IX, 2.
412 [Vol. 55
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engineer, is to be appointed by the World Bank during the
transition period, and thereafter jointly by the two
governments.5 0 As per Annexure F, the neutral expert is
competent to determine the amount of water that Pakistan
is entitled to from the Ravi and the Sutlej;51 the boundary
basin for the Indus, Chenab, and the Jhelum;52 whether or
not any use of water or storage in addition to that provided
in the Treaty is carried out by India on the Western
Rivers;5 3 questions relating to obligations with respect to,
and maintenance of drains; 54 various questions pertaining
to the appropriateness of water use;55 questions pertaining
to financial compensation upon the agreement of both
commissioners; 56 and determination of costs. 57
If the subject matter is not within article IX (2)(a), 5s or
if the neutral expert believes that the difference is a
"dispute," then the treaty provides three options. First, the
commission shall report the dispute to the two governments
with the reasoned views of each commissioner. 59 Secondly,
50. Id. annex. F, pt. 2, 4. "The Bank shall be notified of every
appointment, except when the Bank is itself the appointing authority." Id.
51. Id. annex. F, pt. 1, 1(1).
52. Id. annex. F, pt. 1, 1(2).
53. Id. annex. F, pt. 1, 1(3).
54. Id. annex. F, pt. 1, 1(4).
55. Id. annex. F, pt. 1, T 1(5)-(23).
56. Id. annex. F, pt. 1, 2.
57. Id. annex. F, pt. 1, 3.
58. If the two commissioners cannot agree that it is a matter covered by
Part I of Annexure F, then
the Neutral Expert shall, after hearing both Parties, decide whether or
not it so falls. Should he decide that the difference so falls, he shall
proceed to render a decision on the merits; should he decide otherwise,
he shall inform the Commission that, in his opinion, the difference
should be treated as a dispute.
Id. annex. F, pt. 2, 7. If it is partly a dispute, the expert has the option of
deciding the part which he or she is competent to decide, or can inform the
Commission that the entire matter should be treated as a dispute. Id.
59. See id. art. IX, 3 ("As soon as a dispute to be settled in accordance with
this and the succeeding paragraphs of this Article has arisen, the Commission
shall, at the request of either Commissioner, report the fact to the two
Governments, as early as practicable, stating in its report the points on which
the Commission is in agreement and the issues in dispute, the views of each
Commissioner on these issues and his reasons therefor.").
20071 413
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upon receipt of this report, or after determining that the
report has been unduly delayed, each government can try to
settle the dispute by agreement with the help of a
mediator. 60 Thirdly, the governments can arbitrate the
dispute. 61 The decision of the neutral expert is binding on
all parties and any arbitral tribunal established under the
treaty.62
In the event that the "difference" becomes a "dispute,"
either party can institute arbitration. 63 The court of
arbitration is to be comprised of seven arbitrators: two
appointed by each of the parties, and three umpires-a
highly qualified engineer, an international law expert, and
a person qualified to be the chairman of the court.64 The
annexure provides detailed provisions on the appointment
process and requires the establishment of a standing panel
60. See id. art. IX, 4 ("Either Government may, following receipt of the
report referred to in Paragraph [3], or if it comes to the conclusion that this
report is being unduly delayed in the Commission, invite the other Government
to resolve the dispute by agreement. In doing so it shall state the names of its
negotiators and their readiness to meet with the negotiators to be appointed by
the other Government at a time and place to be indicated by the other
Government. To assist in these negotiations, the two Governments may agree to
enlist the services or one of more mediators acceptable to them.").
61. See id. art. IX, 5 ("A Court of Arbitration shall be established to
resolve the dispute in the manner provided by Annexure G (a) upon agreement
between the Parties to do so; or (b) at the request of either Party, if, after
negotiations have begun pursuant to Paragraph (4), in its opinion the dispute is
not likely to be resolved by negotiation or mediation; or (c) at the request of
either Party, if, after the expiry of one month following receipt by the other
Government of the invitation referred to in Paragraph (4), that Party comes to
the conclusion that the other Government is unduly delaying the
negotiations.").
62. See id. annex. F, pt. 2, 11 ("The decision of the Neutral Expert on all
matters within his competence shall be final and binding, in respect of the
particular matter on which the decision is made, upon the Parties and upon any
Court of Arbitration established under the provisions of article IX (5).").
63. See id. annex. G, 2 ("The arbitration proceeding may be instituted (a)
by the two Parties entering into a special agreement (compromis) specifying the
issues in dispute, the composition of the Court and instructions to the Court
concerning its procedures and any other matters agreed upon between the
Parties; or (b) at the request of either Party to the other in accordance with the
provisions of article IX (5)(b) or (c). Such request shall contain a statement
setting forth the nature of the dispute or claim to be submitted to arbitration,
the nature of the relief sought and the names of the arbitrators appointed under
Paragraph 6 by the Party instituting the proceeding.").
64. See id. annex. G, 4.
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of arbitrators. 65 Each arbitrator is to have one vote, with
the chairman having the deciding vote in the event of a
tie.66
Article IX was the subject of difference resolved by the
neutral expert in early 2007. In January 2005, upon the
request of Pakistan, which objected to India's building of
the Baglihar Dam on the Chenab River, a neutral expert
had to be appointed under the Treaty. 67 Raymond Lafitte, a
professor at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in
Lausanne, was appointed by the World Bank to make a
decision on the differences between the two governments. 68
He declared his final verdict on February 12, 2007, partially
upholding some objections of Pakistan while limiting some
flow control capabilities of the dam design. However, he
overruled Pakistani objections on height and gated control
of the spillway, finding that these conformed to engineering
specifications.
The Indus Treaty is high on obligation, high on
precision,69 and high on delegation. Under the Abbott-
Snidal model, this is an example of hard legalization. The
Treaty has continued to survive despite the three wars that
were fought between the two countries and has proved to be
effective for the purpose for which it was adopted. One
author writes that
[t]here was intense pressure from hardliners in India for New
65. Id. annex. G, 5-10.
66. See id. annex. G, 16.
67. See Ramaswamy R. Iyer, Baglihar: The Points at Issue, HINDU, Oct. 19,
2005, http://www.hindu.com/2005/10/19/stories/2005101905471100.htm ("[T]he
specific points of difference over Baglihar relate to (a) the design of the Project;
(b) the extent of pondage; and (c) the placement of the spillway gates and the
water intake.").
68. See Dale Lautenbach, World Bank Names Neutral Expert on Baglihar,
World Bank News Release No: 2005/463/SAR (May 10, 2005), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/sar (search "2005/463/SAR"; then follow "South Asia-
World Bank Names Neutral Expert on Baglihar" hyperlink).
69. One example of the precision includes article VI, which makes extensive
use of a detailed verification regime, under which both states are required to
regularly exchange "daily gauge and discharge data relating to the flow of the
rivers," daily reservoir extractions or releases, and daily withdrawals and
escapages from all canals. These data may be requested by the other party as
frequently as on a daily basis, if available. See Indus Treaty, supra note 33, art.
IV.
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Delhi to abrogate the Indus Waters Treaty, which would be seen
by Pakistan as a threat to cut off water at some point in the
future. Many in India went even further, arguing not only that the
meeting should be skipped, but that India should abrogate the
treaty altogether. Instead, India conducted the commission
meetings because it wanted to "show the world that it is behaving
responsibly. 70
The second agreement that is the subject of analysis is
the Rann of Kutch Agreement that was signed between the
two nations in 1965.71 This was the result of the threat of
escalating military hostilities over a territorial dispute
pertaining to the Rann of Kutch.72 Under British coaxing,
the two countries agreed to a cease-fire and to submit the
dispute to arbitration.73 The terms of the agreement
provided that the parties would undertake "to implement
the findings of the tribunal in full as quickly as possible,"
and that the tribunal should remain intact until its findings
had been implemented. 74 The agreement allowed each party
to nominate a member of the tribunal, with its chairman to
70. Kraska, supra note 47, at 493-94.
71. Rann of Kutch Arbitration (India v. Pak.), 7 I.L.M. 633 (1968)
[hereinafter Rann of Kutch Agreement].
72. See J. Gillis Wetter, The Rann of Kutch Arbitration, 65 AM. J. INT'L L.
346, 346 (1971). India and Pakistan both claimed the Rann as part of their
territory. The preamble to the agreement states:
WHEREAS both the Governments of India and Pakistan have agreed
to a cease-fire and to restoration of the status quo as at 1 January,
1965, in the area of the Gujarat/West Pakistan border, in the
confidence that this will also contribute to a reduction of the present
tension along the entire Indo-Pakistan border; WHEREAS it is
necessary that after the status quo has been established in the
aforesaid Gujarat-West Pakistan border area, arrangements should be
made for determination and demarcation of the border in that area ....
Rann of Kutch Agreement, supra note 71, pmbl.
73. See Rann of Kutch Agreement, supra note 71, art. 1-2 ("Article 1: There
shall be an immediate cease-fire with effect from 0030 hours GMT, on 1 July,
1965. Article 2: On the cease-fire: (i) All troops on both sides will immediately
begin to withdraw; (ii) This process will be completed within seven days. .. ").
74. See id. art. 3(iv) ("The decision of the Tribunal referred to in (iii) above
shall be binding on both Governments, and shall not be questioned on any
ground whatsoever. Both Governments undertake to implement the Findings of
the Tribunal in full as quickly as possible and shall refer to the Tribunal for
decision of any difficulties which may arise between them in the
implementation of these findings. For that purpose the Tribunal shall remain in
being until its findings have been implemented in full.").
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be appointed by the Secretary General of the United
Nations. 75 After the Tribunal rendered its award, the
parties jointly demarcated the boundary, and the Tribunal
was dissolved on September 22, 1969.76 The entire process
was concluded in about four years, and it was marked by a
spirit of cooperation. 77 Copeland writes that "[n]either side
questioned the authority of the Tribunal, and both sides
worked together to implement the decision," and that one of
the reasons for the success of the arbitration was that the
issues were well defined. 78 This agreement, under the
Abbott-Snidal model, would be an example of hard
legalization with a high level of obligation, high level of
precision, and high level of delegation. It is perhaps no
coincidence that this is one of the most successful
agreements between the two nations. It is also significant
that the agreement was signed on the Pakistani side by a
military leader rather than a politician, supporting
arguments pertaining to correlation between regime and
legalization, and the need to enlist the key compliance
community-here, the Pakistani army.
The third agreement for analysis is the Tashkent
Declaration, signed by the two countries in the immediate
aftermath of the second war between them in 1965. 79 Under
75. See id. art. 3(iii) ("[T]here will be constituted, within four months of the
cease-fire, a Tribunal consisting of three persons, one of whom would be a
national of either India or Pakistan. One member shall be nominated by each
Government and the third member, who will be the Chairman, shall be jointly
selected by the two Governments. In the event of the two Governments failing
to agree on the selection of the Chairman within three months of the cease-fire
they shall request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to nominate the
Chairman.").
76. Carla S. Copeland, The Use of Arbitration to Settle Territorial Disputes,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3073, 3078 n.49 (1999).
77. See id.
78. Id. at 3080.
[I]mportant to the success of the arbitration was that the dispute over
the Rann did not represent a major political dispute between the
two countries. The Rann had little economic or strategic value and was
sparsely populated. Thus, although large-scale fighting preceded
the arbitration proceedings, the dispute was more symbolic than
substantive.
Id. at 3081.
79. Tashkent Declaration, India-Pak., Jan. 10, 1966, 560 U.N.T.S. 39,
available at http://www.ipcs.org/INDO-PAK- 13-Docu.pdf. The preamble recites:
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the brokerage of the Soviet Union, Indian Prime Minister
Lal Bahadur Shastri and the Pakistani President,
Muhammad Ayub Khan, met for the Tashkent Conference
from January 4th through the 10th, with the Soviet
Premier, Kosygin, playing the role of a mediator and
facilitating the signing of the document that met with some
criticism in India.8 0 Under this agreement, the two
countries agree to make "all efforts to establish good
relations . . . in accordance with the United Nations
Charter" and "reaffirm their obligation . . . not to have
recourse to force and to settle their disputes through
peaceful means."8' Both sides agreed to withdraw their
troops to positions held prior to the commencement of the
hostilities, and in a foreshadowing of the Simla Agreement,
"agree[d] to follow the principle of non-interference in their
affairs '8 2 and "discourage the use of any propaganda
against each other."8 3 The language of the declaration was
mainly general and vague, containing such promises as one
to take "measures towards the restoration of economic and
trade relations, communications, as well as cultural
exchanges between the two countries."8 4 Some of the few
provisions containing action pertained to the repatriation of
The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having met
at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India
and Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and
peaceful relations between their countries and to promote
understanding and friendly relations between their peoples. They
consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for the
welfare of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan.
Id. pmbl.
80. See id. art. IX ("The Prime Minister of India and the President of
Pakistan recorded their feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the
leaders of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for their constructive,
friendly and noble part in bringing about the present meeting which has
resulted in mutually satisfactory results. They also express to the Government
and friendly people of Uzbekistan their sincere thankfulness for their
overwhelming reception and generous hospitality.").
81. Id. art. I.
82. Id. art. III.
83. Id. art. IV ("[B]oth sides will discourage any propaganda directed
against the other country, and will encourage propaganda which promotes the
development of friendly relations between the two countries.").
84. Id.
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prisoners of war,8 5 and the resuming of diplomatic
relations.8 6
This agreement is medium to high on obligation
(committing the parties to renounce violent methods to
solve disputes),8 7 low on precision (as it does not provide
much content for the obligations and does not spell out the
consequences of violation), and low-to-nonexistent on
delegation. Under the Abbott-Snidal model it is an example
of low legalization. It is hard to understand the reasons for
the contrast between the Tashkent Agreement and the
Rann of Kutch Agreement given that they are proximate in
terms of time. The former is characterized by soft
legalization (or no legalization) whereas the latter is an
exemplar of successful hard legalization. One can only
speculate whether this is because the parties did not intend
that their obligations be binding or because they did not
appreciate the effect of legalization on ensuring compliance.
The fourth accord of significance is the oft-quoted Simla
Agreement of July 2, 1972.88 It was signed by Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi of India and President Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto of Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of the war
between the two nations resulting in the creation of the new
nation of Bangladesh.8 9 The first paragraph of the
agreement states that
[t]he Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are
resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and
confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work
for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and
the establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent, so that
both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies
85. See id. art. VII ("The Prime Minister of India and the President of
Pakistan have agreed that they will give instructions to their respective
authorities to carry out the repatriation of the prisoners of war.").
86. See id. art. VIII.
87. See id. art. II ("The Prime Minister of India and the President of
Pakistan have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be
withdrawn not later than 24 February, 1966, to the positions they held prior to
5 August, 1965, and both sides all observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire
line.").
88. Agreement on Bilateral Relations, India-Pak., July 2, 1972, 858 U.N.T.S.
71, available at http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Kashmir/shimla.htm
[hereinafter Simla Agreement].
89. See id.
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to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their peoples. 90
In order to give effect to this hortative statement of intent,
the two parties commit to applying "the principles and
purposes of the Charter of the United Nations" in their
relations. 91 They also declare that they will "settle their
differences by peaceful means through bilateral
negotiations or by any other peaceful means" and that "both
shall prevent the organization, assistance or
encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance
of peaceful and harmonious relations . *."..92 Under the
agreement the two countries recognized that "the pre-
requisite for reconciliation, good neighborliness and durable
peace between them is a commitment by both the countries
to peaceful co-existence, respect for each other's territorial
integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each
other's internal affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual
benefit . . . ."93 They also agreed to "refrain from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of each other."94 Recognizing the state of
hysteria that existed on both sides of the border, the two
governments committed to "take all steps within their
power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each
other. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of
such information as would promote the development of
friendly relations between them."9 5 This is a key clause as it
comes in the background of hysterical and one-sided media
coverage in both countries and the tendency to demonize
each other. With regard to immediate normalization of
relations following the war, the agreement committed both
sides to "resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea,
land including border posts, and air links including
overflights, . . . to promote travel facilities . . . [to resume]
trade and co-operation in economic and other agreed fields,"
and to promote exchanges in science and culture.96
90. Id. 1.
91. Id. 1(i).
92. Id. 1(ii).
93. Id. 1(iii).
94. Id. 1(iv).
95. Id. 2.
96. Id. 3.
420 [Vol. 55
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With regard to de-escalating tensions along the border,
both sides agreed to withdraw troops and maintain the
cease-fire line as the border. 97 Both sides also committed to
periodic meetings to ensure that the peace process
continued. 98 The Simla Accord continues to have rhetorical
value to this day and even pronouncements by militant
Islamic groups based in Pakistan bear this out.99
An examination of the Simla Accord using the
legalization lens reveals that it is medium or high on
obligation: committing the states to peace to "prevent the
organization, assistance of encouragement of any acts
detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious
relations,"'100 and so forth. It is relatively low on precision
because it does not stipulate in detail how these objectives
are to be achieved, and the consequences of violation of the
obligations assumed. It is low to non-existent on delegation
as the agreement is silent on implementing agencies,
enforcement, monitoring, and interpretation. Under the
Abbott and Snidal model, the Simla Accord is an example of
97. Id. 4(ii) ("In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from
the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without
prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to
alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations.
Both sides further undertake to refrain from threat or the use of force in
violation of this line."). This is an important part of the agreement and the Line
of Control has grown into something approximating a permanent border over
time. Id.; see also Michael Fathers, Play Nice, TIME ASIA, Feb. 5, 2001, at 18
(noting that the Simla Agreement established the Line of Control as the
informal border between India and Pakistan); Charles Sanctuary, Contentious
Line of Control, BBC NEWS, Jan. 4, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world
/southasia/377916.stm (confirming that the Line of Control basically matches
the frontline at the end of the 1947 war). The Line of Control became the flash
point for many cross-border incursions and a constant build of troops. See Int'l
Crisis Group, Kashmir: Confrontation and Miscalculation, ASIA REPORT No. 35,
July 11, 2002, at 9, available at http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/asia/
afghanistan southasia/reports/A400696_11072002.pdf [hereinafter Int'l Crisis
Group] (describing the nuclear use policies of India and Pakistan in the Indo-
Pak conflict); see also id. at 1 (detailing the history of the Line of Control).
98. See Simla Agreement, supra note 88, 6.
99. See, for example, the statement by the chief of the Pakistani religious
organization Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Maulana Fazal-ur Rehman, noting that
"Kashmir is a big issue but both the countries have the Simla Agreement as a
guiding principle to solve their disputes bilaterally." Rediff India Abroad, Simla
Accord Still Relevant: Jamait Chief, July 17, 2003, http://www.rediff.com/
news/2003/jul/17pak.htm.
100. Simla Agreement, supra note 88, 1(ii).
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low legalization. This may signal the fact that the parties
did not intend to undertake serious obligations and saw the
accord only as a stopgap. This could certainly be true in the
case of Pakistan as it had suffered enormously in the 1971
war, having lost East Pakistan entirely, and having
endured the ignominy of Indian forces deep into its territory
in the west. Pakistan had clear incentives to avoid hard
legalization as it would be negotiating from an inferior
bargaining position and would not want to undertake
obligations that it would find hard to get out of. Given the
shrewdness of Zulfikar Bhutto, this conclusion is
inescapable. It remains something of a mystery as to why
India gave up the enormous bargaining advantage that it
possessed by virtue of its victory in the 1971 war to embody
the accord in a legally binding agreement that was
structured as an exemplar of hard legalization. Given the
precarious nature of democracy in Pakistan, it should have
had every reason to reduce the agreement to hard
legalization in order to have the assurance that the
Pakistani army would consider it binding. If the obligations
enshrined in the Simla Agreement had been supported by
high levels of precision and delegation, the chances of its
success would have been significantly enhanced. In contrast
to the Rann of Kutch Agreement, which was hard
legalization, the Simla Accord is regarded as a failure
insofar as it has failed to resolve the differences between
the parties, although it is no small fact that there has been
no full-scale war since its conclusion. 10 1 It may also be a
limited success in terms of establishing bilateralism as the
dominant approach to solving disputes between the states.
In 1988, India and Pakistan entered into an agreement
to prohibit the attacking of each other's nuclear
installations. 10 2 According to the agreement, "[e]ach party
101. One author argues that the agreement is actually a stumbling block.
See, Farrell, supra note 24, at 315 ("Because of its strict requirement of
bilateralism, the Agreement has been viewed as a roadblock preventing any
real progress.").
102. The preamble of the agreement declares that
[t]he Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the
Government of the Republic of India, herein after referred to as the
Contracting Parties, reaffirming their commitment to durable peace and
the development of friendly and harmonious bilateral relations; conscious
of the role of confidence building measures in promoting such bilateral
relations based on mutual trust and goodwill ....
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shall refrain from undertaking, encouraging or
participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at
causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear
installation or facility in the other country."103 For the
purposes of the agreement, it appears that no distinction
was made between civilian and military nuclear facilities.
The operative term states that nuclear installation or
facility "includes nuclear power and research reactors, fuel
fabrication, uranium enrichment, isotopes separation and
reprocessing facilities as well as any other installations
with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and materials in any
form and establishments storing significant quantities of
radio-active materials. '"104 The agreement requires each
side to notify the other about the precise locations of their
respective nuclear facilities. 10 5 The agreement is high on
obligation, reasonably high on precision, and low on
delegation. It appears to be couched in the language of hard
legalization and compliance is difficult to measure in the
absence of a full-blown war following the agreement.
In 1992, India and Pakistan entered into an agreement
that provided for "the complete prohibition of chemical
weapons.106 The agreement included a commitment to
Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and
Facilities, India-Pak., Dec. 31, 1988, http://indianembassy.org/SouthAsia/
PakistanProhibitionAttackNuclearDec_31_1988.html [hereinafter Agreement
on Nuclear Installations].
103. Id. 1(i). It was signed by Humayun Khan, Foreign Secretary of
Pakistan, and K.P.S. Menon, Foreign Secretary of India. See id.
104. Id. 1(ii).
105. Id. 2 ("Each Contracting Party shall inform the other on 1st January
of each calendar year of the latitude and longitude of its nuclear installations
and facilities and whenever there is any change.").
106. Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,
India-Pak., Aug. 19, 1992, available at http://www.indianembassy.org/
SouthAsia/Pakistan/JointDeclartion C W August191992.html [hereinafter
Joint Declaration on Chemical Weapons]. The preamble recites:
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the
Government of the Republic of India, reaffirming their commitment to
durable peace and the development of friendly and harmonious
relations; conscious of the role of confidence building measures in
promoting such bilateral relations based on mutual trust and goodwill;
recognizing that disarmament agreements constitute an important
confidence building measure; reaffirming their respective unilateral
declarations of non-possession of chemical weapons; convinced that a
complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons will contribute
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abjure from developing, possessing or using chemical
weapons, as well as to refrain from assisting, encouraging
or inducing, in any way, anyone to engage in the
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling or use of
chemical weapons. 10 7 At the time of the signing of the
agreement, both parties declared that they did not possess
stockpiles of chemical weapons. This agreement is high on
obligation, low on precision, and low on delegation.
The political climate on the Indian side was
unpredictably altered by the pro-Hindu Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) in March 1998. Given its pre-election bluster
and historical antipathy towards Muslims, the BJP was
expected to be tough on Pakistan. Early indications were
that war would be a distinct possibility. Within months of
assuming office, the government conducted four nuclear
tests in 1998.108 The international community was taken by
surprise and it was assumed that Pakistan would have to
respond. Tit-for-tat tests followed shortly thereafter.
Sanctions were imposed on both countries. Faced with the
horrors of a nuclear war in one of the most populous regions
of the world, international attention was finally turned on
getting the two countries to resume dialogue. In February
1999, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Indian
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee resolved to negotiate,
and in a highly symbolic move Mr. Vajpayee traveled to
Lahore by bus. The two sides issued a joint communique,
known as the Lahore Declaration. 10 9 The agreement kindled
to the security of all States; reaffirming their respective commitment to
the Protocol for Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare ....
Id. pmbl.
107. Id. 1.
108. For an archive of related stories, see Global Beat: South Asian Nuclear
Crisis, http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/pubs/india.html (last visited Mar. 30,
2007).
109. The preamble to the Lahore Declaration states that
[t]he Prime Ministers of the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan:
Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries, and of
progress and prosperity for their peoples;
Convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious
relations and friendly cooperation will serve the vital interests of the
peoples of the two countries, enabling them to devote their energies for
[Vol. 55424
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hopes of a final resolution to the vexed Kashmir issue and
there was much optimism that a breakthrough was
imminent. Under the agreement, each side
shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue
of Jammu and Kashmir; shall refrain from intervention and
interference in each other's internal affairs; shall intensify their
composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and
positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda; shall take
immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and
doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence
building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at
prevention of conflict; reaffirm their commitment to the goals and
objectives of SAARC and to concert their efforts towards the
realisation of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and beyond with
a view to promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to
improve their quality of life through accelerated economic growth,
social progress and cultural development; reaffirm their
condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and
their determination to combat this menace; shall promote and
protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 1 10
Clearly, the Lahore Declaration contains some lofty
objectives, but the language is worded in such generalities
a better future;
Recognising that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of
the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict
between the two countries;
Committed to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United
Nations, and the universally accepted principles of peaceful co-
existence;
Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the
Simla Agreement in letter and spirit;
Committed to the objective of universal nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation;
Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence building
measures for improving the security environment;
Recalling their agreement of 23rd September, 1998, that an
environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest
of both sides and that the resolution of all outstanding issues, including
Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose ....
Lahore Declaration pmbl., India-Pak., Feb. 21, 1999, available at
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/ip/ip-lahore/9990221.html.
110. Id.
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that it is impossible to enforce. Under the Abbott-Snidal
model it would be high on obligation, low on precision, and
low-to-non-existent on delegation. Although the agreement
frequently uses the word "shall," the absence of any content
and precision, coupled with the complete absence of
enforcement and monitoring mechanisms militates against
it being much of an agreement. This was destined to be its
downfall. Just a few months later, Pakistani-backed
insurgents, under the charge of the military establishment,
without apparent political backing, launched a campaign in
Indian Kashmir requiring military action by India to evict
them. When matters seemed to be escalating with the
possibility of Indian reprisals beyond Kargil, President
Clinton pressured the Pakistani Prime Minister to
withdraw. The military establishment appeared to be
beyond the control of the elected representatives and the
humiliating withdrawal from Kargil culminated in a coup
orchestrated by General Pervez Musharraf.
Considered to be the architect of the military actions in
Kargil, Mr. Musharaff was regarded with distaste in India
and the peace process regressed. When it became apparent
that Mr. Musharaff was here to stay, India reassessed its
stance towards the military regime and invited him for a
summit in Agra. There was a renewed expectation that this
summit would be a furtherance of the thaw that had been
initiated by the Lahore Declaration, but it ended in
recriminations and the Indian side felt that they had been
used by a canny Mr. Musharaff to bolster his credibility in
Pakistan and to grandstand on the global stage. There are
no published drafts of the agreement or credible
explanations for the failed negotiations and it is hard to pin
blame precisely. According to some, "Pakistan's insistence
on the 'settlement' of the Jammu & Kashmir issue, as a pre-
condition for the normalisation of relations" was the
breaking point. 1 '
111. A.G. Noorani, The Truth About Agra, HINDU, July 29, 2005, at 7,
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2215/stories/20050729002104400.htm.
According to an author on the Pakistani side,
Pakistani officials maintain that the Indians backtracked thrice on an
agreed draft following pressure from some of their cabinet ministers
opposed to the peace process. The Indians objected to the formulation
of the proposed declaration which reportedly said that, 'The settlement
of the Kashmir issue would pave the way for normalisation of relations
between the two countries.'
[Vol. 55426
CONFLICTS AND LEGALIZATION
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the
World Trade Center, Kashmiri separatists attacked the
state legislature in Srinagar in Indian Kashmir killing
thirty-eight people. Perhaps emboldened by this, militants
associated with Lashkar-e-Taiba assaulted the Indian
Parliament and killed fourteen people on December 13th.
India alleged that Pakistan was responsible for both
attacks and there was talk in India of bombing terrorist
camps in Pakistan. Alarmed at the prospect of war and its
impact on its operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. induced
both sides to return to the negotiating table. India agreed to
stop its military deployment along the border, and Pakistan
pledged to destroy terrorist camps inside its territory. As
far as this author is aware, these agreements have not been
reduced to writing and there does not appear to be any
mechanism to ensure compliance. The Congress Party's
return to power in 2004 has not had much of an impact on
the peace process and negotiations are in limbo.
2. Impact of Legalization. The history of negotiations
between the two countries reveals the pervasive lack of
trust. 112 This reveals several opportunities for legalization
to work. The twin attributes of precision and delegation can
reduce distrust by providing relevant information ex ante
and a mechanism for verification ex post. Precision
minimizes the potential for opportunistic interpretations
and increases the cost of such conduct. Delegation
minimizes the need for reliance on the other party's
integrity alone by vesting monitoring and enforcement in a
third party. The salutary effect of this can be seen in the
Zahid Hussain, A Bridge Too Far, NEWSLINE, Aug. 2001, at 2
http://www.newsline.com.pkNewsAug2001/coverstoryl.htm. The then Indian
Prime Minister Vajpayee said that "During the talks, he [General Musharraf]
took a stand that the violence that was taking place in Jammu and Kashmir
could not be described as 'terrorism.' He continued to claim that the bloodshed
in the State was nothing but the people's battle for freedom." According to him,
it was this stand that resulted in the failure of the Agra Summit. Musharraf to
Blame for Summit Failure, HINDU, Sept. 27, 2006, http://www.hindu.com/2006/
09/27/stories/2006092711440100.htm.
112. "There has been trust deficit in our relations with Pakistan. But we
cannot stand still," Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said at a recent press
conference. "I sincerely believe that our two countries have to find ways and
means to get over the problems, that include terrorism," Singh said. Indo-Pak
Relations Suffering from 'Trust Deficit': PM, TIMES INDIA, Sept. 24, 2006,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2022986.cms.
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workings of the Indus Waters Treaty, most recently in the
Baglihar dispute. When India informed Pakistan of its
intention to construct a dam in Baglihar, it was met
immediately with objections that reached a crescendo when
the project was commenced in 1999. Despite the two
countries being in a heightened state of military
deployment since 1998, the existence of the Indus Waters
Treaty, and its highly legalized scheme prevented the
dispute from being a part of the cocktail of reasons for going
to war. The existence of a mechanism for resolving the
dispute meant that it did not have to be added to the list of
irresolvable disputes. Had the treaty not been high on all
three attributes of legalization-say, if it had been low on
delegation-the parties would have to have added it to their
fight. Legalization created a separation of the dam dispute
from the other cankers and allowed the parties to debate it
within the processual framework of the treaty. The
existence of the Indus River Commission presented the first
forum for dispute resolution and indeed, this was where the
parties negotiated for over three years. When Pakistan was
on the verge of requesting the World Bank to appoint a
neutral expert under the treaty in 2003, India responded
with an offer for bilateral negotiations that kept the parties
within a processual framework for another two years. When
the neutral expert was finally appointed in 2005, it
committed the parties to provisions of the treaty to await a
determination by the neutral expert. Without the pressure
valve being released at various junctures by the treaty's
process, the "difference" between the two countries could
possibly have escalated into another dispute that created
more distrust and hardened positions.
3. Participation from Key Actors. Every agreement is
only applicable to the parties that are signatories to it. If
the agreement leaves out key actors, the fact that it
exhibits all the dimensions of hard legalization will have
very little effect. The Indus Waters Treaty's success is in no
small measure because of its success in co-opting the key
constituencies-the political actors, engineers, and the
World Bank. By making all three sections a key part of the
working of the treaty, it minimizes the opportunity for
dissonance. Legalization is particularly well-suited to
increasing the range of actors that can be co-opted because
of its salutary effect on the flow of information. This
becomes even more pertinent in polities that are
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characterized by a high degree of centralization like
Pakistan. The nitty-gritty of agreements that are low on
legalization is typically known only to a handful of elite
political actors. While actors that are hostile to the
agreement are likely to be well mobilized, regardless of the
details, the informational offshoots of a process of hard
legalization have the potential to facilitate the mobilization
of actors that are favorably inclined to the agreement. Such
actors include peace activists, political parties, religious
organizations, businesses, and even the legal community.11 3
Political parties have not had much success historically in
Pakistan's foreign policy debates. It is likely that
legalization, at best, provides them with information that
can be used to lobby more powerful constituencies like the
intelligence services, religious leaders, and the army.114 In
the Indian context, legalization serves to build consensus
and buy-ins from fractious political parties which
frequently act as if they have no long-term policies apart
from one-upmanship. Legalization's institutional processes
offer venues to air opinions freely, and the level of
dissonance can serve to signal India's level of commitment
to the agreement, and the potential risks with regard to
compliance depending upon the party in power. Hard
legalization can also be useful in countries like India
because of the range of political ideologies on view. India's
Parliament has representation from the communists, the
socialists, Hindu-nationalists, Muslim League, various
regionalists, casteists, and moderates. Various coalitions
have been in power in recent years and legalization can
serve to constrain Parliament in case it is more war-prone
than the executive branch and vice-versa.
4. Lessons from the India-Pakistan Experience. The
113. See Kahler, supra note 8, at 667-68. Kahler also lists the judiciary and
business entities as powerful constituencies in the context of legalization. In
other cases, the risk of these revenue streams being threatened by legalization
has had the opposite effect and the legal community has been the primary
opponent of legalization. Id. One example of this is the stinted opposition of the
English legal profession to the U.K.'s ratification of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods in 1980. See Angelo
Forte, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: Reason and Unreason in the United Kingdom, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 51
(1997).
114. See David L. Richards, Perilous Proxy: Human Rights and the Presence
of National Elections, 80 Soc. ScI. Q. 648, 648-65 (1999).
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foregoing analysis appears to show that legalized
agreements have had a higher degree of success than non-
legalized ones. The three agreements that have been
successful (Rann of Kutch, Indus Waters, Chemical
Weapons) all exhibit hard legalization under the Abbott-
Snidal framework. Future work on agreement design would
benefit from legalized agreements that exhibit high levels of
obligation, precision, and delegation. The evidence of
conduct between India and Pakistan also shows that what
Abbott and Snidal would characterize as soft legalization is
not regarded either as law or as a constraining influence by
both states. Military action has not been prevented by the
Simla and Lahore Agreements, and both sides disregard
them with impunity when it suits them. This is in distinct
contrast to those agreements that are characterized by hard
legalization being observed as legal and binding, despite the
onset of military conflict. The conclusion seems powerful
that India and Pakistan do not place much value in non-
legal agreements in terms of compliance and do not believe
that they are bound by obligations contained in such
agreements.
The functionalist argument that soft law is
advantageous because of lower contracting costs-by which
is meant the expenditure in terms of drafting time,
negotiation, ratification, etc.-may have to be modified in
the context of high-conflict states. Abbott and Snidal argue
that hard legalization is more costly because states are
more careful in "negotiating and drafting legal agreements,
since the costs of violation are higher."115 The argument
with regard to hard law being more costly than soft law is
only true on one front-ratification. All the other costs are
incurred in the case of "soft law" too. Experts will still be
consulted; differences between competing interests must
still be resolved; negotiation is still just as contentious-as
proponents of various interests argue just as vigorously-
exemplified so powerfully in the Agra summit discussed
hereinbefore. A modified functionalist thesis is presented by
Raustiala who argues that the risk of opportunistic conduct
115. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 18, at 434. They write that "[1]egal
specialists must be consulted; bureaucratic reviews are often lengthy. Different
legal traditions across states complicate the exercise. Approval and ratification
processes, typically involving legislative authorization, are more complex than
for purely political agreements." Id.
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may be the causal variable that "suggests that pledges will
be observed only when the risk of opportunism is low and
uncertainty high."116 In the case of high-conflict states the
trust deficit creates conducive conditions for opportunistic
conduct and suggests that hard legalization may be
preferable.
Hard legalization would also appear to be supported on
the basis of liberal theory which suggests that credibility is
factored into the choice of soft law versus hard law. Aliter,
when credibility is dependant on legislative approval, states
are more likely to prefer hard law unless the state
possesses other mechanisms to ensure and enhance
credibility. 1 7 Raustiala writes that in "more technocratic
and arcane areas, the available empirical evidence suggests
that the prevalence of pledges roughly, if inconsistently,
rises as uncertainty rises-as functional theory predicts."'1 8
He provides examples to support both the functionalist
claim that uncertainty influences the form of international
agreement and the liberal claim that pledges are "most
common in areas of low domestic salience." 119 Given that
Pakistan is not a democratic society and is subject to
capricious regime change, it would be in India's interest to
enhance the credibility of Pakistan's commitments by
insisting on hard legalization. This would ensure that it has
the ability to read signals conveyed by the key
constituencies as a result of the debate stirred up by the
high levels of obligation, precision, and delegation so as to
hone its own negotiating strategy after gauging seriousness
on the other side, and to ensure that successor governments
do not have the ability to unravel soft law commitments on
the plea that they are not binding.
Insisting on hard legalization will also focus attention
on obligation-a dimension of legalization that the Abbott-
Snidal thesis does not elaborate upon. Their theory would
not suggest an answer to the question as to whether
obligations can be legitimately entered into by a military
116. Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99
AM. J. INT'L L. 581, 593 (2005). "[Tjhe risk of opportunism may be central to the
choice between legal and nonlegal agreement." Id. at 594.
117. See id. at 600.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 601.
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dictator who seizes power in a coup. If the answer is in the
negative, hard legalization will not help India very much as
long as President Musharaff leads Pakistan. It may be
possible to mitigate the democratic deficit by other
processes that legalization triggers-for example,
parliamentary deliberation and debate-to the extent that
Pakistan's current constitutional structure allows it. In any
event, hard legalization is preferable even on this view
because it has informational advantages over non-
legalization or soft legalization, as there is no room for
participation by parties other than the nominees of the
illegitimate power holder, and there is no way in which the
other side can gauge the reaction of the legitimate players.
B. Darfur
Darfur, a region in the western part of Sudan, is home
to about 6 million people. 120 The root of the conflict in
Darfur appears to be the creation of two rebel groups, the
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM), which took form in 2001
and 2002 in opposition to the government in Khartoum.
While initially content to stage attacks on government
facilities, the weak-kneed response from Khartoum
apparently emboldened the rebels into launching more
daring raids on military targets.121 In an apparent reaction
to these attacks and the fact that its military included
significant numbers of Darfuris who were reluctant to take
arms against their own brethren, the Khartoum regime
seems to have struck upon the devious ploy of creating an
army of the willing to fight the rebels. 122 Calculated to
benefit from historical divisions among the tribes, this
resulted in the creation of the "Janjaweed," meaning
"armed bandit or outlaw on a horse or camel," essentially
120. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR AND BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES IN DARFUR 2 (2004),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/36028.htm [hereinafter DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES
IN DARFUR].
121. See Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry, Report of the International Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60
(Jan. 23 2005), available at http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com-inq_
darfur.pdf [hereinafter COI Report].
122. See id. at 23-25.
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tribesmen who had enlisted to kill Darfuris. 123 The violence
appears to be directed at the non-Arab population although
they share a common religion, Islam, with the Arab
population of Sudan. 124 While the precise source for the
ethnic hatred is unclear, it has been suggested that the
tensions are owed to the scarcity of land and grazing
rights. 125
So began the world's "greatest humanitarian crisis."126
In the words of the U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator for
Sudan, Mukesh Kapila: 'The only difference between
Rwanda and Darfur now is the numbers involved . ...
[This] is more than just a conflict, it is an organized
attempt to do away with a group of people."' Heralding the
terrible carnage that was to follow, he said: .'[T]he pattern
of organised attacks on civilians and villages, abductions,
killings and organised rapes by militias was getting worse
by the day .. and could deteriorate even further. One can
see how the situation might develop without prompt
[action] ... all the warning signs are there.' ' 127 The United
Nations is struggling to cope with the sheer scale of the
tragedy: approximately two million people in camps in
Darfur and another 200,000 people inside Chad along the
Darfur border.128 There are hundreds of thousands of
123. Id. at 24.
124. See DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES IN DARFUR, supra note 120.
125. See Shams Ghoneim, The Horror of Darfur, IOWA CITY PRESS-CITIZEN,
Dec. 24, 2006.
126. A Daily Journal of Politics, NEW REPUBLIC, July 21, 2005,
http://www.tnr.com/etc.mhtml?pid=2733.
127. Eric Reeves, We Have Learned Nothing from Rwanda, SUDANREEVES.ORG,
July 6, 2005, http://www.sudanreeves.org/Sections-article508-pl.html (quoting
Mukesh Kapila); see also DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES IN DARFUR, supra note 120
("The primary victims have been non-Arab residents of Darfur. Numerous
credible reports corroborate the use of racial and ethnic epithets by both the
Jingaweit and GOS military personnel; 'Kill the slaves; Kill the slaves!' and 'We
have orders to kill all the blacks' are common. One refugee reported a militia
member stating, 'We kill all blacks and even kill our cattle when they have
black calves.' Numerous refugee accounts point to mass abductions, including
persons driven away in GOS vehicles, but respondents usually do not know the
abductees' fate. A few respondents indicated personal knowledge of mass
executions and gravesites."). Reeves writes that Mr. Kapila was forced to resign
under pressure from Khartoum. Eric Reeves, The "Two Darfurs": Redefining a
Crisis for Political Purposes, SUDANREEVES.ORG, May 20, 2005,
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Sections-article5l4-p 1.html.
128. See Eric Reeves, Genocide in Darfur-How the Horror Began, SUDAN
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persons who are unaccounted for-it is unknown whether
they are dead, hiding, staying with relatives or friends, or
not on the books of the United Nations. 129 The Coalition for
International Justice (CIJ), the organization appointed by
the State Department and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (US AID) found that more than
200,000 people have died in the violence in Darfur, a figure
that obviously undercounts significantly. 1 30 Most Darfuris
believe that about 90 percent of all African villages have
now been destroyed.
Despite the nature of the killings and the length of time
it has been going on, the international community has
shown a marked reluctance to call it genocide. The
reluctance starts with the United Nations. On July 30,
2004, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1556,131
TRIBUNE, Sept. 3, 2005, at 4, available at http://www.sudantribune.com/
article.php3?idarticle=l144; S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30,
2004); see also Office of Deputy Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-
General for Sudan, Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 8, 16 (Nov. 1, 2004)
("The total conflict-affected population in Darfur is estimated at 2.27 million
people, one third of the estimated pre-conflict population of 6.3 million. The
total number of IDPs in Darfur is estimated at 1.65 million, while the number
of affected residents accessed by humanitarian agencies is about 627,000....
The numbers are highest in West Darfur with a total of 833,036 affected people,
which is half of the pre-conflict West Darfur population of 1.6 million. The West
Darfur figure includes 652,509 IDPs. South Darfur has 761,030 conflict-affected
people, including 595,594 IDPs. North Darfur, registering the lowest number of
the three Darfur States, has an estimated 685,200 conflict affected people, of
which 403,000 are IDPs."); Colin L. Powell, United States Secretary of State,
Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Sept. 9, 2004),
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powelllremarks/36042.htm.
129. See Reeves, supra note 128, at 2 ("Extant data suggest that between
350,000 and 400,000 have perished during the past 29 months.").
130. Id. at 5. Reeves also writes that "as villagers have fled to camps for
displaced persons and into eastern Chad, they have created extremely
vulnerable populations in highly concentrated locations." Id. at 4.
131. S.C. Res. 1556, supra note 128. The preamble of resolution 1556
[r]eiterat[es] [the Security Council's] grave concern at the ongoing
humanitarian crisis and widespread human rights violations, including
continued attacks on civilians that are placing the lives of hundreds of
thousands at risk, [c]ondemn[s] all acts of violence and violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law by all parties to the
crisis, in particular by the Janjaweed, including indiscriminate attacks
on civilians, rapes, forced displacements, and acts of violence especially
those with an ethnic dimension, and expressing its utmost concern at
the consequences of the conflict in Darfur on the civilian population,
including women, children, internally displaced persons, and refugees ....
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calling upon Khartoum to fulfill commitments it made to
disarm the Janjaweed militias and apprehend and bring to
justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates.' 32 The
Security Council resolution also called on Khartoum to
allow humanitarian access to Darfur. 133 It placed an
embargo on the sale or supply of material and training to
non-governmental entities and individuals in Darfur.134 The
resolution endorsed the African Union deployment of
monitors and a protection force to Darfur. 135 It requested
the Secretary-General to report on Khartoum progress in 30
days and held out the possibility of further actions,
including sanctions, against Khartoum in the event of non-
compliance. 136 The U.N. Commission of Inquiry (COI)
report on Darfur issued in January 2005 was of the opinion
that there was "insufficient evidence of genocidal intent" on
the part of the NIF.' 37 The COI Report notes that
"[h]undreds of incidents have been reported involving the
killing of civilians, massacres, summary executions, rape
and other forms of sexual violence, torture, abduction,
looting of property and livestock, as well as deliberate
destruction and torching of villages."'138 It did find evidence
of state complicity and involvement in the killings,
however, and asked for all violations of international law in
Darfur to be referred to the International Criminal Court
Id. pmbl.
132. The resolution was drafted by the United States and co-sponsored by
Britain, France, Germany, Chile, Spain and Romania. It was passed by a vote of
13-0, with China and Pakistan abstaining. Press Release, Security Council,
Security Council Demands Sudan Disarm Militias in Darfur, U.N. Doc. SC/8160
(July 30, 2004).
133. See S.C. Res. 1556, supra note 128, 1.
134. See id. 7.
135. See id. 3.
136. See id. 6.
137. COI Report, supra note 121, at 3 ("[T]he Commission established that
the Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to
crimes under international law. In particular, the Commission found that
Government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including
killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages,
rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement,
throughout Darfur.").
138. Id. at 59.
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(ICC).139 This was accepted by the U.N. Security Council,
which passed a resolution on March 31.140 The COI Report
concluded that there was no "specific intent" necessary for
"genocide." 141 A European Union report found that there
was "widespread, silent and slow killing going on, and
village burning on a fairly large scale," yet refused to call it
genocide. 142
The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in May
2006, between the Government of the Sudan (GoS) and the
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)-Minawi
faction, in Abuja, Nigeria. 143 The agreement was the result
of intense negotiations and appeared to be on the verge of
collapse at various times with a breakthrough being
achieved only due to sustained pressure from the U.S. and
other interested parties. 4 4 Despite this, the SLA faction of
Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nur (SLA/AW) and the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) have refused to sign the
139. See id. at 5, 59-60.
140. S.C. Res. 1593, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
141. COI Report, supra note 122, at 141. The Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a)
Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S 277. The consequence of labeling conduct as genocide
is that it triggers an obligation under article 1 to prevent and to punish it as a
crime under international law. See id.
142. See Press Briefing, Pieter Feith, Pers. Representative of Javier Solana
for Sudan/Deputy Director General of the Council General Secretariat, EU
Action in Sudan/Darfur (Aug. 9, 2004); see also Sudan to Attend Peace Talks in
Nigeria on Darfur: EU Finds No Evidence of Genocide in Darfur, WASH. POST,
Aug. 9, 2004, http://www.genocidewatch.org/SudantoAttendPeaceTalksinNigeri
aonDarfur9august2004.htm.
143. Darfur Peace Agreement, May 5, 2006, available at http://allafrica.coml
peaceafrica/resources/view/00010926.pdf [hereinafter DPA].
144. See Glenn Kessler, Darfur Peace Accord A Battle of Its Own, WASH.
POST, May 9, 2006, at A18 (.'I'm disappointed in you. I expect people to keep
their word,' Zoellick icily told Minnawi, according to observers. 'I can be a very
good friend, but I am a fearsome enemy."').
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agreement. 145 Abdel Wahid's discontent with the DPA
pertains to the lack of more direct SLA participation in the
implementation of security arrangements, provisions for
political representation, and a victim's compensation
fund. 146 The JEM's grievances are that the agreement does
not address the political imbalances that were the source of
the conflict. When faced with the prospect of two years of
negotiations being futile, the African Union's mediators
tried to end the stalemate by allowing separate bilateral
power-sharing talks between the government and Abdel
Wahid's faction. With the familiar old ploy of divide and
conquer, the government hoped that the fear of being
marginalized would lead the faction to sign up, but Abdel
Wahid got cold feet at the last moment. 147
The DPA, in its preamble, states that the parties
"condemning all acts of violence against civilians and
violations of human rights, and stressing full and
unconditional acceptance of their obligations under
International Humanitarian Law, international human
rights law, and relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions"
resolved to enter into the agreement to "be a significant
step towards a just, peaceful and lasting political solution to
the conflict in Darfur."'148 In its chapter on General
Principles for Power Sharing, the DPA provides for
citizenship as the basis for civil and political rights and
145. See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, DARFUR'S FRAGILE PEACE AGREEMENT 1 (2006),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4179&l=1.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 1, 2.
Abdel Wahid gave as reasons for his decision: continued attacks on his
forces, both on the ground and in negative propaganda; and the
initiative taken by the SLAMM and JEM to attend a high-level
meeting in Tripoli on 6 January 2006 without consultation with his
faction and then to form the Revolutionary Alliance of Western Sudan
on 18 January 2006. Even an ephemeral and ill-advised initiative by
the Slovenian presidency of the European Union (EU) to resolve the
Darfur conflict played a role in undermining the shaky rebel unity. See
'Important statement from the SLA negotiating team on the
circumstances surrounding the decision by Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nur
to cease the coordination and common vision', dated 17 February 2006,
posted on Sudaneseonline.com on 18 February 2006.
Id. at 2 n.7.
148. DPA, supra note 143, pmbl.
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obligations, 149 for the peaceful devolution of power through
democratic means, 150 separation of powers, 151 rule of law,152
free and fair elections, 153 a federal system of government, 154
the creation of a constitutional court, 155 and greater
representation for women. 156
Recognizing that the violence has its roots in the
disenchantment of the Darfuris, the DPA states that
"[a]ffirmative action shall be taken in favor of Darfurians in
order to enhance inclusivity in public services."'1 57 Despite
the fact that the perceived sense of injustice felt by the
Darfuris was the source of the conflict, this provision is high
on obligation, low on precision, and has no delegation
attribute under the legalization framework. It is unclear as
to how affirmative action policies will be crafted, at what
levels, to what extent, and what remedy exists for claims by
private individuals.
The agreement provides protections against illegal
arrest and detention, 158 a presumption of innocent until
proven guilty, 59 right to be informed of reasons for
arrest, 6 0 right to legal representation, 161 right to legal aid if
the person cannot afford a lawyer, 162 fair trial,163 and
149. See id. art. 1, 2; see also id. art. 3, 24 ("The Parties reiterate their
commitment to respect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms
as detailed below and in international human rights covenants ratified by the
GoS.").
150. See id. art. 1, 4.
151. See id. art. 1, 5.
152. See id. art. 1, 6.
153. See id. art. 1, 8.
154. See id. art. 1, 9.
155. See id. art. 1, 13.
156. See id. art. 1, 15.
157. Id. art. 2, 19.
158. See id. art. 3, 25.
159. See id. art. 3, 25(a).
160. See id. art. 3, 25(b).
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. art. 3, 25(c).
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attainder. 164 The DPA also provides for the right to life and
liberty, 165 freedom from torture, 166 freedom from cruel and
unusual punishment, 167 a right to privacy, 168 right to vote in
elections, 169 right to acquire property, 70 right to freedom of
religion,' 71 and freedom of speech and expression. 172 While
these human rights look impressive on paper, and are high
on obligation and precision, it is unclear as to what sort of
delegation is contemplated. There is no provision that
expressly guarantees a right to access the courts to make a
claim for violation of any of these rights. As far as this
author can tell, there is no provision granting special
jurisdiction to a court to hear matters pertaining to these
rights in a manner that is different from ordinary claims
under other statutes. It is also unclear as to what kinds of
remedies any court that is seized of matters relating to
these rights can grant. The DPA does not seem to make any
judgments by courts under these rights binding on the
government. The only provision that gives any guidance is
paragraph 41: "There shall be no derogation of the above
rights and freedoms except as provided for in the
Constitution [into which this Agreement shall be
incorporated]. The Human Rights Commission provided for
in the INC, which shall enjoy full independence, shall
monitor the application of the rights and freedoms provided
for herein."'173
In order to facilitate the establishment of a federal
structure and separation of powers, the DPA establishes a
Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) for the
164. See iA. art. 3, 25(e).
165. See id. art. 3, 26.
166. See id. art. 3, 29.
167. See id.
168. See id. art. 3, 32.
169. See id. art. 3, 31.
170. See id. art. 3, 33.
171. See id. art. 3, 36; see also id. art 3, 39 ("Ethnic and cultural
communities shall have the right to practise their beliefs, use their languages
and develop their cultures within their customs.").
172. See id. art. 3, 37 ("Every person shall have an unrestricted right to
freedom of expression, reception and dissemination of information and
publication .... ).
173. Id. art. 3, 41.
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interim period. 174 It is to have widespread authority for
"facilitating the return of refugees and internally displaced
persons, coordinating the restoration of security, and
promoting peace and reconciliation throughout Darfur."'175
The permanent status of Darfur is to be determined by a
referendum within twelve months after the elections in
Darfur and no later than 2010.176 Paragraph 57 provides
two options for determination by the referendum: "(a) The
creation of a Darfur Region composed of the three states; (b)
Retention of the status quo of three states."177 The DPA
provides representation at the senior level to members of
the SLM and the JEM including: one senior assistant to the
president, one cabinet minister in addition to the existing
three, and two state ministers in addition to the existing
three; 178  the chairmanship of one Parliamentary
Committee; 179 as well as twelve National Assembly seats;18 0
and one commission chairmanship. These provisions are
high on obligation, precision, and delegation. The last
attribute is particularly important for the conduct of the
referendum and the express provision for international
monitors is a welcome sign.' 8 ' The DPA also provides for
increased representation of Darfuris in the judiciary, 8 2 the
174. See id. art. 6, 48.
The TDRA . . . shall serve as the principal instrument for the
implementation of this Agreement and for enhancing coordination and
cooperation among the three States of Darfur. The TDRA shall be a
symbol of reconciliation and unity of the people of Darfur and their
effort to build a future based on peace and good neighborliness.
Id. art. 6, 49.
175. Id. art. 6, 53.
176. See id. art. 6, $ 56.
177. Id. art. 6, 57.
178. See id. art. 8, TT 68-69(b).
179. See id. art. 8, 69(c).
180. See id. art. 8, 71.
181. See id. art. 6, 58 ('The National Elections Commission (NEC) shall
organize and supervise the referendum on the status of Darfur. The National
Elections Law shall specify the rules and procedure governing the referendum.
The referendum shall be internationally monitored.").
182. See id. art. 10, T 73 ("Darfurians shall be adequately represented in the
Constitutional Court, the National Supreme Court and other National Courts,
as well as in the National Judicial Service Commission, by competent and
qualified lawyers.").
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civil service, 8 3 national organizations and institutions,18 4
the armed services, 8 5  and educational institutions. 8 6
Educational opportunities for Darfuris were to be addressed
on a priority basis with interim measures.18 7 The preceding
provisions are high on obligation and medium on precision,
but very low on delegation. Yet, at their core, these
provisions are most likely to continue the feeling of
disenfranchisement amongst the average Darfuri, and a
higher level of delegation would have been preferable. The
Senior Assistant to the President will also be Chairperson
of the TDRA, is to be appointed by the President, and will
be the fourth highest ranking member of the government. 8 8
The Senior Assistant, apart from being responsible for the
implementation of the agreement, also has several other
powers, including appointments. 8 9 This provision is high
on all three attributes of legalization. With regard to the
183. See id. art. 11, 75 ("In order to create a sense of national unity and
belonging, Darfurians shall be fairly represented in the National Civil Service
Commission."); see also id. art. 11, 76 ("[A] Panel of Experts shall be
established under the National Civil Service Commission to determine the level
of representation of Darfurians in the NCS across all tiers . . . (a) The Panel
shall identify any area of imbalances that have undermined the representation
of Darfurians in the NCS and make practical and action-oriented
recommendations ... ").
184. See id. art. 13, 84.
185. See id. art. 12, 79 ("Darfurians shall be fairly represented at all levels
[in the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)], including in senior command positions....").
186. See id. art. 14, 85 ("Darfurians shall be fairly represented in the
Management and Governing Councils of Public Universities and other
educational institutions of higher learning in the National Capital and in
Darfur, taking into account the requirements of qualification and competence.").
187. See id. art. 14, 88 ("[N]ot less than 15% of the annual intake of public
universities and other institutions of higher learning in the National Capital,
and not less than 50% in the case of such universities and institutions located
in Darfur, shall be reserved for students from Darfur for a minimum period of
ten years.").
188. Id. art. 8, 65; see also id. art. 8, 66 ("The Senior Assistant shall
have powers that will enable him/her influence national policies. To this end,
he/she shall be a member of, inter alia, the National Council of Ministers, the
National Security Council and the National Planning Council and shall
participate in their deliberations and decision-making.").
189. See id. art. 8, 66(e). Appointees included "the Heads of the Darfur
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission, the Darfur Reconstruction and
Development Fund, the Darfur Land Commission, the Darfur Security
Arrangements Implementation Commission, the Darfur Peace and
Reconciliation Council, [and] the Darfur Compensation Commission." Id.
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demarcation of the border, the DPA requires the parties to
retreat to pre-January 1, 1956 positions, and creates a
technical ad hoc team to monitor compliance--obligation,
precision, and delegation in action. 190
The DPA's security provisions are contained in Chapter
III. Paragraph 214 commits the parties to "[u]ndertake to
refrain from acts such as mobilization, recruitment or
initiatives that are likely to jeopardize the peace process
including offensive military actions, movements,
deployment of forces and engaging in hostile propaganda
campaigns as a reaffirmation of commitment to create and
maintain a conducive atmosphere." 191  Importantly, it
requires the parties to "[u]ndertake measures to neutralize
and disarm the Janjaweed/armed militias in line with U.N.
resolutions 1556 and 1564 .... -192 The DPA is rather weak
on enforcement 193 of this undertaking, content to requiring
the parties to "[p]ut in place proper mechanisms for the
demobilization, rehabilitation and social reintegration of
former combatants returning to civilian life."194 The DPA
does, however, list a slew of "prohibited activities" in order
to strengthen the ceasefire and promote peace. 195 It also
190. Id. art. 6, 61 ("Without prejudice to the provisions of the CPA relating
to the North-South border and any international agreements in force between
the Republic of the Sudan and neighbouring countries, the northern boundaries
of Darfur shall return to the positions as at 1 January 1956. A technical ad hoc
team shall be established to carry out demarcation accordingly.").
191. Id. art. 22, 214(c).
192. Id. art. 22, 214(f).
193. See id. art. 23, 223 ("If the Parties are unable to resolve the dispute
through consensus, the Chairperson of the Joint Commission shall consult with
the international members of the Joint Commission and issue a final Ruling.
The Parties shall be bound by the ruling.").
194. Id. art. 22, 214(k); see also id. art. 22, 214(l) (stating that the
Parties "[u]ndertake that all the troops and forces under their command at all
levels ensure observance, implementation and protection of the present
Agreement").
195. See id. art. 24, 226 ("(a) All attacks against the members and
locations of another Party, including acts of sabotage, hostage-taking, detention,
laying of mines and seizure of property and materiel belonging to another
Party. (b) All attacks, harassment, abduction, intimidation and injury to
civilians, including IDPs, humanitarian workers and other noncombatants, and
any seizure of their equipment and property . . .(1) Any recruitment into the
military forces of a Party in Darfur. (in) Any recruitment or use of boys and
girls under age 18 years by Parties. (n) All hostile propaganda and incitement
to military action.").
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charges the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with
responsibility for monitoring and verification of
compliance. 196 AMIS's responsibilities include inspection
and certification of assembly areas for rebel fighters; 197
establishment and enforcement of buffer zones1 98 from
which the parties are excluded around IDP camps and main
humanitarian corridors; 199 building community policing
mechanisms; 200 establishing separate police counters for
reporting crimes committed against women;20 1
establishment of a plan for nomadic migration;20 2 and
separation of the parties' areas of control. A Ceasefire
Commission is to be established under the chairmanship of
the AMIS commander, 203 with the E.U. and the U.S. as
observers. 204 The DPA recognizes the utility of non-legal
sanctions like naming and shaming in two places in
connection with the monitoring of ceasefire: Paragraph 247,
and Paragraph 250, which mandates the Joint Commission
to "take decisive action in relation to ceasefire violations...
[by] [p]ublicising the violation and the name of the Party
196. See id. art. 25, 229; see also id. art. 27, $T 291, 359-62.
197. See id. art. 27, 342.
198. See id. art. 27, $ 329 ("A Buffer Zone shall be an area in which the
following rules apply: (a) There shall be no forces of any Party and no other
armed groups and militia. (b) There shall be no military activities conducted by
any Party or any armed group or militia. (c) There shall be no carrying of
weapons by any person who is not a member of AMIS, except in accordance
with the provisions for policing contained in this Agreement.").
199. See id. art. 26, 268; see also id. art. 27, 323(c) ("In consultation with
the Parties, the Chairperson of the Ceasefire Commission shall establish Buffer
Zones in the areas of most severe conflict."); id. art. 27, 323(d) ("AMIS shall
monitor and patrol the Buffer Zones."); id. art. 27, T 328 ("In the interests of
disengagement, confidence-building and enhanced security, the Chairperson of
the Ceasefire Commission, in consultation with the Parties, shall establish
Buffer Zones in the areas of most intense conflict. The boundaries of the Buffer
Zones shall be indicated clearly on maps.").
200. See id. art. 26, TT 272-73.
201. See id. art. 26, 278.
202. See id. art. 26, 288.
203. See id. art. 25, 7 240.
204. See id. art. 25, 241. Paragraph 247 is interesting: "The Chairperson
of the Ceasefire Commission shall issue regular press statements on violations
of the ceasefire, following investigations of the incidents, and shall post these
statements on the websites of the AU and AMIS and give copies to the Parties."
Id. art. 25, 247. This is perhaps an attempt to name and shame the
offenders-a recognition of the role of non-legal sanctions.
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that committed the violation."20 5 This is in addition to
prosecution and other procedures. 20 6 The DPA contemplates
securing compliance by non-parties to the agreement
through "non-military means. '207
The agreement is rather broad on what constitutes
breach: Paragraph 299 provides that "[a]ny breach of the
rules relating to the disengagement, redeployment and
limited arms control processes presented in this Chapter
shall be a violation of the ceasefire." 208 With regard to
disarming the Janjaweed the DPA seems to leave the entire
responsibility to the GoS.209 It asks the government to
neutralize the Janjaweed, and provides some guidance as to
how this is to be done. 210 It allows the GoS to undertake
"[e]nforcement operations in selected localities with the
intent of apprehending and disarming," to "[c]onfiscat[e] ...
heavy and long-range weapons systems, crew-operated
weapons and motor vehicles," to prosecute and punish
criminals, and to take any other actions contained in the
205. Id. art. 26, 250(a); see also id. art. 26, 256 ("The Chairperson shall
issue regular public statements on ceasefire violations and progress towards
implementing this Agreement and shall post these statements on the websites
of the AU and AMIS and give copies to the Parties.").
206. See id. art. 25, 250(b)-(d).
207. Id. art. 27, 334 ("Within their respective areas of control, the Parties
shall endeavour through non-military means to ensure compliance with the
ceasefire by other armed groups and militia that are not parties to this
Agreement, including negotiations, mediation and traditional forms of conflict
resolution; enlisting the support of traditional leaders and local authorities; and
arms control methods, including registration of arms, storing of arms and
restrictions on carrying of arms.").
208. Id. art. 27, 299.
209. See id. art. 27, 314 ("The GoS shall present to the Ceasefire
Commission a comprehensive plan for neutralising and disarming the
Janjaweed/armed militia specifying actions to be taken during all phases of the
Ceasefire."); see also id. art. 27, 317 ("The GoS, with support from AMIS, shall
take all other steps required to completely eliminate the threat posed by
Janjaweed/armed militia to the civilian population and ensure compliance with
the Ceasefire.").
210. See id. art. 27, 338 ("The GoS shall neutralise the threat posed by the
Janjaweed and armed militia in areas of GoS control. This shall include
confining them and controlling their movement within strictly limited locations.
Details of these activities shall be provided to AMIS."); id. art. 27, 339 ("In
coordination with AMIS and the Ceasefire Commission, the GoS shall take the
necessary robust action against Janjaweedlarmed militia according to the
approved plan.").
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plan with the consent of the Ceasefire Commission. 211 In an
attempt to aid verification, the DPA empowers the AMIS to
inspect locations where the parties are required to hold
their weapons. 212 The DPA also assigns responsibility for
policing to the GoS and AMIS, depending on who controls
the zones. 21 3 The preceding security provisions are high on
obligation and precision, but medium on delegation because
the AMIS is not assigned any capacity to do anything in the
event of breach. Without a strong pro-active and offensive
capability, the delegation function is rather useless in a
security context.
Realizing that no amount of military planning will
provide a conclusive solution, the DPA contains provisions
pertaining to the reintegration and rehabilitation of former
combatants. It requires the creation of a Reintegration
Plan 214 and the convening of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue
and Consultation (DDDC), which is intended to be a
meeting of all the relevant stakeholders. 215 The objective of
this conference is to address the political causes for the
conflict and to find a way to bring about a lasting peace,
211. Id. art. 27, 367.
212. See id. art. 27, 370-71.
213. See id. art. 27, 322.
214. See id. art. 29, 439.
215. See id. art. 31, 458. The agenda for the DDCA is to include:
(a) Measures for popularising and implementing this Agreement;
(b) Inter-communal and inter-tribal reconciliation;
(c) Safe return of refugees and IDPs;
(d) Land, water and natural resources, locations and regulation of
nomadic migration routes;
(e) Human security and socio-economic issues;
(f) Small arms control and the interim regulation of community
defence groups pending final disarmament;
(g) Ensuring that political differences are addressed through civil
political processes and not through violence;
(h) The status and powers of Native Administration;
(i) Measures to preserve the multi-ethnic character of Darfur and
(i) [sic] Measures to address the special issues and concerns of
women.
Id. art. 31, 484.
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firstly by publicizing the DPA.216 This lofty objective is
somewhat tainted by the fact that the DDDC is merely an
"advisory and facilitation mechanism," and is only given the
power to "make recommendations and observations to the
national and Darfur authorities, including community
leaders. '217  These provisions exhibit high levels of
obligation, but low levels of precision and delegation.
In the event that there is disagreement concerning the
interpretation of the DPA, paragraph 508 provides that
"[t]he Parties agree to settle any disagreement or dispute
arising under this Agreement by peaceful means. The
Parties further agree that in the event of a dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of this
Agreement, they shall refer the matter to the A.U.
Commission. ' 218 This is a key provision and a higher level of
delegation would have seen a provision like that in the
Indus Waters Treaty providing for binding arbitration,
perhaps under the aegis of the African Union. By stopping
short of such a provision, the DPA runs the risk of being
violated with impunity, as the parties know that there is no
enforcement machinery and consequent sanction for breach.
The DPA also provides an innovative feature to ensure that
the agreement does not remain purely on paper: an
independent Darfur Assessment and Evaluation
Commission (DAEC), with the objective of promoting "the
full and timely implementation" of the agreement. 21 9 The
DAEC is to be comprised of three representatives from the
GoS including the advisor to the President on matters
relating to Darfur, three representatives from the SLM/A
and the JEM, one designated representative from the
African Union, five representatives from the observer states
and organizations, and a maximum of three additional
representatives from such other states, or regional or
international bodies, as shall be agreed by the Parties.220
216. See id. art. 31, T 459-67; see also id. art. 31, 479 ("The first function
of the DDDC shall be to popularise this Agreement and obtain support for it
from all stakeholders in Darfur. This shall include discussing, understanding
and disseminating the various component parts of this Agreement.").
217. Id. art. 31, 469-70.
218. Id. art. 32, 508.
219. Id. art. 33, 511. The DAEC is to be formed within 3 months of the
agreement. See id.
220. See id. art. 33, 512.
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The DEAC is charged with the responsibility to monitor
implementation of the agreement on an ongoing basis, to
assess difficulties and redress them, to "consult and
coordinate" with other relevant agencies, maintain close
ties with the Parties to facilitate their full compliance, and
to liaise with other regional and international
organizations. 221
On the economic front, one of the most contentious
wealth sharing provisions in the DPA is related to
"compensation." Article 10 of the Declaration of Principles,
agreed by the parties on July 6, 2005, states: "Steps shall be
taken to compensate the people of Darfur and address
grievances for lives lost, assets destroyed or stolen, and
suffering caused. ' 222 The main sticking point appeared to be
the distinction between reconstruction funding and
compensation for individual losses; the government's
position was that reconstruction funding was compensation,
while the separatists wanted that to be separate. 223 As part
of the economic package, the DPA set up the Darfur
Reconstruction and Development Fund to allow persons
affected by the conflict to rebuild their lives. The fund
requires commitments from the government to provide $300
million at start up and $200 million in 2007. Given the
enormity of the financial needs and the limited resources
possessed by Khartoum, a donors conference is to be
convened by the international community.
In the immediate aftermath of the DPA, there were
worries that the Janjaweed would act as spoilers. These
worries came true on May 8th, with Janjaweed militia
attacking villages near Buram, in South Darfur. A week
thereafter, on May 15th, the Janjaweed killed eleven
civilians in attacks against villages around Kutum, North
Darfur, and burned villages around Donkey Dereisa, south
of Nyala in South Darfur. A couple of days later, the
Janjaweed fired at an A.U. patrol. The U.N. and the A.U.
held the Janjaweed responsible for the deaths of at least 60
people during that week alone. There were also claims from
221. See id. art. 33, 515.
222. Id. art. 17, 101.
223. One of the reasons for the NCP's opposition to compensation was the
concern that to allow compensation would be an acceptance that the
government was responsible for the killings. See id. art. 17, 98-102.
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the SLAIMM faction that the government was acting in
breach of the agreement by attacking its positions at Dar
es-Salaam in North Darfur on May 21st in concert with the
Janjaweed. Concerned with the claims, counterclaims, and
the rising death toll, the U.N. Security Council declared an
intention to impose sanctions against those who "violate[]
or attempt[] to block the implementation of the Darfur
Peace Agreement .... -224
Analysis of the DPA shows that the main weaknesses
pertain to the third limb of the legalization troika-
delegation. There is a marked reluctance by the parties to
assume accountability and this is a debilitating flaw for an
agreement that is so rich in detail. The difficult process of
achieving agreement on so many details runs the serious
risk of being undone because of a weak delegation thread
that runs through the paragraphs. Coevally, no agreement,
regardless of the extent of legalization, can succeed unless
all the relevant parties are signatories. In the immediate
analysis, it is this fact that has contributed to the DPA's
failure rather than any of the missing attributes of
legalization.
C. Israel-Egypt Peace Agreement
The agreement was signed in 1979 by President Sadat
and Prime Minister Begin under the active encouragement
of President Carter in Washington, D.C. The preamble
recites that the parties are "[c]onvinced of the urgent
necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and
lasting peace in the Middle East .... "225 They agreed to
terminate the war between them, and Israel agreed to
withdraw its troops and civilians from the Sinai behind the
international boundary between Egypt and mandated
Palestine, allowing Egypt to exercise sovereign power over
the Sinai.226 The parties agreed to establish their
permanent boundary in accordance with an agreed-to map,
224. S.C. Res. 1679, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1679 (May 16, 2006).
225. Treaty of Peace, Egypt-Isr., pmbl., Mar. 26, 1979, 1136 U.N.T.S. 115.
226. See id. art. I, 1-2; see also id. annex I, app. art. VIII ("Egypt will
resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over evacuated parts of the Sinai
upon Israeli withdrawal as provided for in article I of this Treaty.").
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leaving aside the position of the Gaza Strip.227 Both sides
agreed to respect the inviolability of each other's territorial
sovereignty. 228 The parties emphasized the applicability of
the UN Charter and other principles of international law
and committed to resolve disputes between them in a
peaceful manner. 229 Given the familiar accusations of proxy
wars, article III, paragraph 2 commits the parties to
ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do
not originate from and are not committed from within its
territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other
forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens
or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to
refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or
participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility,
subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and
undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought
to justice. 230
The preceding provisions are high on obligation, low to
medium on precision, and non-existent on delegation.
Recognizing that distrust can undermine the
agreement, the two sides agreed to the stationing of United
Nations personnel in agreed-upon areas with the
understanding that neither party was to request their
withdrawal. 231 Under the agreement, these personnel were
227. Id. art. II ("The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel in the
recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated
territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to
the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip. The Parties recognize this boundary as
inviolable.").
228. See id.
229. See id. art. III, 1.
230. Id. art. III, 2.
231. See id. art. IV, 2.
United Nations forces will supervise the implementation of this
Appendix and will employ their best efforts to prevent any violation
of its terms .... When United Nations forces deploy in accordance
with the provisions of Article E II of this Appendix, they will perform
the functions of verification in limited force zones in accordance with
Article VI of Annex I, and will establish check points, reconnaissance
patrols, and observation posts in the temporary buffer zones
described in Article II above. Other functions of the United Nations
forces which concern the interim buffer zone are described in Article
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not to be removed unless the removal was to be approved by
the U.N. Security Council. 232 This provided the delegation
element, at least in relation to the high obligation to ensure
that there are no acts of military aggression. Given that
this was the most important obligation under the
agreement, it was perhaps sufficient to provide for
delegation with regard to that obligation.
In order to promote trust and facilitate implementation,
the agreement also provided for the creation of a joint
commission.233 This commission is to meet at least once
every month and is responsible for coordination, problem
resolution, assisting the U.N. forces, organizing the
demarcation of the international boundary, supervising the
handover of installations in the Sinai to Egypt, making
arrangements for the return of the bodies of fallen soldiers,
organizing the setting up of entry points and their
operation, and the discussion of other matters placed before
it by the parties. 234 This joint commission is an example of
medium delegation-while it provides for some precise
responsibilities, the absence of any teeth means that it
cannot be considered an exemplar of high delegation.
A slightly higher example of hard legalization (in its
delegation aspect) is the conferment of responsibility upon
the United States to conduct aerial surveillance during the
withdrawal operations.235 This immediately provides a
neutral verification and enforcement machinery and
strengthens the relevant obligations.
The trust issue surfaces again in article VI when the
parties are obligated to fulfill their obligations under the
treaty in good faith, an extremely important provision given
the fact that the principle of good faith comes with a certain
circumjacence of legal principles that can be enforced. 236
The parties are also required to abjure from entering into
V of this Appendix.
Id. Annex I, app. art. III, 2-3.
232. See id., art. IV, 2.
233. See id.
234. See id. Annex I, app. art. IV, 3(a)-(g).
235. See id. Annex I, app. art. VII, 1(a).
236. See id. art. VI, 2 ("The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their
obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other
party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.").
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other treaty obligations that may run counter to this
agreement. 237 Article V gave Israeli ships and cargoes
destined for Israel the right of unimpeded passage through
the Suez Canal in a non-discriminatory manner.238 These
provisions are high on obligation, but are low on precision
and delegation.
No treaty is free from interpretative difficulties, and if
it does not provide a mechanism for resolving disputes, it
runs the risk of being overtaken by events. The agreement
recognizes this and provides a two-fold dispute resolution
mechanism. In the first instance, disputes are to be
resolved by negotiations. 239 If that fails, the parties are to
attempt to resolve their disputes by conciliation or by
submitting them to arbitration.240 With regard to financial
claims, a claims commission is to be established. 241 These
provisions exhibit marked contrasts to the Simla
Agreement and the DPA, and it is no surprise that there
has been a higher degree of success here with the
agreement being high on delegation.
The protocol attached to the Treaty fleshes out some of
the commitments. It provides a time frame of three years
from the date of the agreement for Israel to complete the
withdrawal of its forces, with interim withdrawal to be
completed in nine months.242 Recognizing the complexity of
237. See id. art. VI, 4. Paragraph 5 provides that "[s]ubject to Article 103
of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligation
of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the
obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented." Id. art. VI, T 5.
238. See id. art. V, 1.
239. See id. art. VII, 1 ("Disputes arising out of the application or
interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.").
240. See id. art. VII, T 2 ("Any such disputes which cannot be settled by
negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.").
241. See id. art. VIII.
242. See id. Annex I, app. art. I, TT 1, 3. There is an extremely detailed
process for withdrawal outlined in Appendix to Annex I, Organization of
Movements in the Sinai:
Both parties agree on the following principles for the sequences of
military movements.
a. Notwithstanding the provisions of article IX, paragraph 2, of this
Treaty, until Israeli armed forces complete withdrawal from the
current J and M lines established by the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement
of September 1975, hereinafter referred to as the 1975 Agreement,
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the withdrawal process and the potential for
miscommunication and possible recriminations, the protocol
provides for the creation of a joint commission 243 to
supervise and coordinate the withdrawal. 244 After the
completion of the work of the joint commission and its
dissolution, "a liaison system is intended to provide an
effective method to assess progress in the implementation
of obligations ... [and] to prevent situations resulting from
errors or misinterpretation on the part of either Party. 245
up to the interim withdrawal line, all military arrangements existing
under that Agreement will remain in effect, except those military
arrangements otherwise provided for in this Appendix.
b. As Israeli armed forces withdraw, United Nations forces will
immediately enter the evacuated areas to establish interim and
temporary buffer zones as shown on Maps 2 and 3, respectively, for
the purpose of maintaining a separation of forces. United Nations
forces' deployment will precede the movement of any other personnel
into these areas.
c. Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have
evacuated any area located in Zone A, units of Egyptian armed
forces shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of article II of
this Appendix.
d. Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have
evacuated any area located in Zones A or B, Egyptian border units
shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of article II of this
Appendix, and will function in accordance with the provisions of
article II of Annex I.
e. Egyptian civil police will enter evacuated areas immediately after
the United Nations forces to perform normal police functions.
f. Egyptian naval units shall deploy in the Gulf of Suez in accordance
with the provisions of article II of this Appendix.
g. Except those movements mentioned above, deployments of
Egyptian armed forces and the activities covered in Annex I will be
effected in the evacuated areas when Israeli armed forces have
completed their withdrawal behind the interim withdrawal line.
Id. Annex I, app. art I, 2.
243. See id. Annex I, app. art. IV, 2 ("The Joint Commission will be
composed of representatives of each Party headed by senior officers. This
Commission shall invite a representative of the United Nations when
discussing subjects concerning the United Nations, or when either Party
requests United Nations presence. Decisions of the Joint Commission will be
reached by agreement of Egypt and Israel.").
244. See id. Annex I, art. I, 4.
245. Id. Annex I, art. VII, 1. Paragraph 3 provides that "[a] direct
telephone link between the two offices will be set up and also direct telephone
lines with the United Nations command will be maintained by both offices." Id.
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The protocol also establishes a detailed aerial and naval
military regime that divides up the area into zones and
delineates allowed activity by both sides to their respective
zones.246 This protocol exhibits high obligation, precision,
and delegation, and once again demonstrates the virtues of
legalization in the context of high-conflict states where
trust is at a premium.
To be sure, no international dispute can be resolved
purely by military solutions. Economic and political
initiatives are just as necessary if a lasting peace is to be
achieved. The Israel-Egypt Agreement recognizes that fact
and in Annex III, a protocol concerning relations of the
parties was signed. Under this protocol, both sides agreed
to establish diplomatic relations after the completion of the
interim withdrawal. 247 The parties agreed to remove
discriminatory trade barriers and committed to
commencing negotiations within six months toward
concluding a trade and commerce agreement. 248 The
protocol also obligated the parties to promote cultural
exchanges, 249 allow the movement of people across
borders, 250 allow access to religious sites, 251 negotiate a civil
aviation agreement, 252  and normal postal and
communications links.253 Article 5 of Annex III contains a
statement of intent to foster good neighborly relations, to
abstain from hostile propaganda against each other, and to
recognize that there is a "mutuality of interest in good
neighbourly relations. '25 4 These provisions, as is probably to
be expected of such commitments, are high on obligation
but low on precision and delegation.
There is no doubt that the agreement is a success. As
recently as 2004, Israel and Egypt concluded a historic
Annex I, art. VII, 3.
246. See id. arts. II-IV.
247. See id. art. I, 3.
248. See id. Annex III, art. 2.
249. See id. Annex III, art. 3.
250. See id. Annex III, art. 4.
251. See id. Annex III, art. 4, 2.
252. See id. Annex III, art. 6, 4.
253. See id. Annex III, art. 6, 6.
254. Id. Annex III, art. 5, 1.
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trade agreement with the U.S.255 This might not have been
possible but for the peace agreement in 1979. It is certainly
true that President Sadat paid a terrible price for his
courage. 256
CONCLUSION
There is a marked distinction on the dimensions of
obligation, precision, and delegation between agreements
that are successful and those that are not. Given the close
proximity of some of the events that have given rise to both
kinds of agreements, it is hard to escape the conclusion that
there is a correlation between hard legalization, on all its
dimensions, and the success of agreements between high-
conflict states. This is owed primarily to the trust deficit
that exists between these states and the potential for highly
legalized agreements to apportion the costs of breach ex
ante. The rationale is similar to that advanced for the need
for long and detailed contracts between parties who either
have no history of successful contracting, or who have a
history of conflict and disagreement. While non-contract
agreements might work perfectly adequately between
parties operating within the embrace of trust, strong
contract language is almost always preferable for parties
operating under the shadow of suspicion. In the context of
high conflict of states, the empirical analysis reveals that
the existence of a third-party guarantor almost always has
a positive correlation to success. The Indus Waters Treaty
and the Israel-Egypt Treaty are both exemplars of this
feature. States characterized by ethno-religious conflicts
should embrace lessons from this fact and aim to structure
agreements such that they are high on obligation, precision,
255. Press Release, U.S., Egypt & Israel to Launch Historic Trade
Partnership, USTR Zoellick to Participate in Signing in Cairo (Dec. 10, 2004),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document Library/PressReleases/2004/
December/UnitedStates,_Egypt Israel to LaunchHistoricTradePartnershi
p_.USTRZoellick toParticipateinSigning-inCairo.html. Mr. Zoellick said:
"'This is the most important economic agreement between Egypt and Israel in
two decades .... It is a concrete, practical result of President Bush's plan to
promote closer U.S. trade ties with the Middle East so as to strengthen
development, openness, and peaceful economic links between Israel and its
neighbors."' Id. One source estimates that 35,000 jobs will be created. Jim
Phipps et al., Middle Eastern Law, 40 INT'L LAW. 597, 602 (2004).
256. President Sadat was isolated in the Arab world and was assassinated
in 1981.
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and delegation if they intend to enter into successful
agreements. It is also clear that agreements that exhibit all
three elements in high degrees will fail unless all relevant
parties are signatories to the agreement. This painful
reality must guide countries like India, which obdurately
refuse to include the various separatist elements in
Kashmir in peace talks. It is rather late in the day to worry
that their inclusion will confer them with legitimacy-they
are already legitimate in the eyes of their constituents and
at least Pakistan; and not much is achieved by India's
obduracy as long as these movements possess the ability to
wreak havoc. The successful role played by the World Bank
should also embolden countries like India to jettison the
knee-jerk post-colonial distrust of third-party mediation.
The presence of a third-party will strengthen delegation,
and given its centrality in ensuring success, it is a feature
of legalization that must receive greater attention in the
structuring of agreements between high-conflict states.

